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[In an era of increased accountability, decisions that adversely affect university students are more 
open to internal and judicial scrutiny. This article considers student challenges to university 
decisions in the context of universities as public bodies. It begins with extrajudicial processes such as 
the University Visitor, parliamentary Ombudsmen and internal university Ombudsmen. It then 
provides a comprehensive analysis of litigation in Australia between students and universities in 
which students have challenged decisions about admission, course content, assessment, academic 
progress and both academic and non-academic misconduct. Australian courts and tribunals have 
accepted jurisdiction in certain circumstances but student–university litigation has generally been 
unsuccessful for the students either on technical jurisdictional grounds or on the facts. Judicial 
consideration of university decisions and administrative processes has provided some guidance that 
may assist in the formulation of improved internal processes, particularly relating to the resolution of 
complaints and appeals. This article argues that the diverse range of courts and tribunals currently 
used by students are inappropriate and inefficient and considers whether the time is right for serious 
consideration to be given to the establishment of a dedicated dispute resolution body for the 
Australian higher education sector.] 
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I   IN T R O D U C T I O N  
The question of how, where and to whom students may challenge university 
decisions is a vexed one. Ideally, all such matters should be resolved by internal 
processes and procedures but this is not always the case. Originally the function 
rested with the University Visitor.1 Now, in the states where the office of the 
University Visitor survives, its role is ceremonial only. How then may this gap be 
filled? Are any of the paths currently taken by students effective, efficient or 
appropriate in light of the unique nature of the relationship between students and 
their universities? If they are not, what would be a solution? Historically, 
students rarely challenged adverse academic or disciplinary decisions outside 
their universities; however, recent empirical research has found that recourse to 
courts and tribunals by Australian university students is increasing and that 
students’ main concerns are about the fairness of university decision-making.2 
Parliamentary Ombudsmen have also reported an increase in university students 
seeking their assistance.3 The previous lack of students seeking external recourse 
may have been due to the existence of the University Visitor and for other 
reasons including ‘satisfaction with internal processes, an inclination to settle 
matters within the community, the costs of litigation, judicial deference to 
university decisions, and cultural attitude’.4 
There can be no doubt that the higher education climate has changed markedly, 
particularly in the last decade, and that the resolution of student grievances has 
 
 1 See below Part III(A) for discussion on the role of the University Visitor. 
 2 See Hilary Astor, ‘Australian Universities in Court: Causes, Costs and Consequences of 
Increasing Litigation’ (2008) 19 Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 156. Astor notes that, 
while it is significant that during the period of her research the number of higher education insti-
tutions doubled and the numbers of students increased threefold, the volume of litigation in-
creased disproportionately (eight times): at 166. While outside the parameters of this paper, it is 
of interest to note that the offices of state Ombudsmen are also seeing an increasing number of 
complaints from students: Bronwyn Olliffe and Anita Stuhmcke, ‘A National University Griev-
ance Handler? Transporting the UK Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education 
(OIA) to Australia’ (2007) 29 Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management 203. This 
was reflected also in a letter of concern written by a number of Ombudsmen to The Australian: 
Bruce Barbour et al, ‘Complaints Give Rise to Concern’, Education, The Australian (Sydney), 27 
April 2005, 34. 
 3 See the discussion in Part III(B) below. 
 4 Fernand N Dutile, ‘Law, Governance, and Academic and Disciplinary Decisions in Australian 
Universities: An American Perspective’ (1996) 13 Arizona Journal of International and Com-
parative Law 69, 116. 
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become a key focus in Australia and elsewhere.5 As students increasingly seek 
external redress, questions such as the nature of the legal relationship between 
the university and the student are being explored.6 This article begins with a 
discussion of the jurisdictional issues arising from the public nature of Australian 
universities. It considers the demise of the function of the University Visitor and 
points to the current extrajudicial avenues for the resolution of student griev-
ances — the parliamentary Ombudsmen and the internal university student 
Ombudsmen. What follows is a comprehensive review and analysis of recent 
student litigation in Australia. The focus is on legal proceedings in which 
students have challenged all manner of decisions, including those relating to 
admission, course content, assessment, academic progress and misconduct. This 
consideration encompasses the wide range of issues which have arisen in federal 
and state courts and tribunals, relating to the different types of university 
decisions and different types of allegations against the universities concerned.7 
With the exception of only a few successes by students in gaining access to 
information affecting their academic progress, the case law in this area docu-
ments a series of failed proceedings for the students concerned. The almost 
universal lack of success is either on technical grounds or on the facts. It is clear 
that litigation is not working for students. Neither can it be working for universi-
ties in terms of time, money and energy expended on fighting such claims in the 
courts. Now is surely the time for serious consideration to be given to an 
alternative approach such as an Ombudsman with a function specially dedicated 
to the resolution of student–university grievances. 
 
 5 See Patty Kamvounias and Sally Varnham, ‘In-House or in Court? Legal Challenges to 
University Decisions’ (2006) 18 Education and the Law 1. For an overview of the situation in the 
United Kingdom, see, eg, Glyn Jones, ‘“I Wish to Register a Complaint”: The Growing Com-
plaints Culture in Higher Education’ (2006) 10 Perspectives: Policy and Practice in Higher 
Education 69; Neville Harris, ‘Resolution of Student Complaints in Higher Education Institu-
tions’ (2007) 27 Legal Studies 566. 
 6 See, eg, Clive B Lewis, ‘The Legal Nature of a University and the Student–University Relation-
ship’ (1983) 15 Ottawa Law Review 249; Victoria J Dodd, ‘The Non-Contractual Nature of the 
Student–University Contractual Relationship’ (1985) 33 Kansas Law Review 701; Francine 
Rochford, ‘The Relationship between the Student and the University’ (1998) 3(1) Australia & 
New Zealand Journal of Law & Education 28; David Palfreyman, ‘The HEI–Student Legal 
Relationship, with Special Reference to the USA Experience’ (1999) 11 Education and the Law 
5; Sam Middlemiss, ‘Legal Liability of Universities for Students’ (2000) 12 Education and the 
Law 69; Martin Davis, ‘Students, Academic Institutions and Contracts — A Ticking Time 
Bomb?’ (2001) 13 Education and the Law 9; William P Hoye and David Palfreyman, ‘Plato vs 
Socrates: The Devolving Relationship between Higher Education Institutions and Their Students’ 
(2004) 16 Education and the Law 97; Bruce Lindsay, ‘Student Subjectivity and the Law’ (2005) 
10 Deakin Law Review 628; Bruce Lindsay, ‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law: 
Negotiating the Legal Terrain of Student Challenges to University Decisions’ (2007) 12(2) Aus-
tralia & New Zealand Journal of Law & Education 7. 
 7 Although litigation involving universities and their staff raises similar issues, a discussion of staff 
challenges to university decisions is beyond the scope of this paper. However, see, eg, Orr v The 
University of Tasmania (1957) 100 CLR 526 (dismissal of professor for misconduct); Williams v 
Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509 (criminal information laid against persons involved in dismissal of 
senior lecturer); Rindos v University of Western Australia [1995] WAIComm 11 (21 February 
1995) (refusal to grant tenure); Bailey v Australian National University [1995] HREOCA 27 (29 
September 1995) (allegation of discrimination); Whitehead v Griffith University [2003] 1 Qd R 
220 (decision to censure lecturer for misconduct); Gauci v Kennedy [2007] EOC ¶93-467 (alle-
gation of sexual harassment). 
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I I   AU S T R A L I A N  UN I V E R S I T I E S:  STAT U TO RY FR A M E W O R K  A N D  
JU R I S D I C T I O N A L IS S U E S 
Almost all of Australia’s 39 universities are ‘special purpose statutory corpora-
tion[s]’8 established under state or territory legislation9 to serve the traditional 
public functions of institutions of higher education. The University of Mel-
bourne, for example, was created to ‘serve the Victorian, Australian and interna-
tional communities and the public interest’ 10  and the University of Western 
Australia was incorporated because it was ‘desirable that provision should be 
made for further instruction in those practical arts and liberal studies which are 
needed to advance the prosperity and welfare of the people’.11  The idea of 
universities as public institutions has been explained in the following terms in 
relation to The University of Sydney:12 
The Senate’s functions of providing instruction, conferring degrees, and so on, 
may be regarded as public functions … [the University] is one which was es-
tablished by a public Act, is largely supported by public funds, is open to all 
scholastically qualified residents of the State, and is subject to some degree of 
public control.13 
Public control of public universities is extensive. In New South Wales, for 
example, universities are subject to privacy legislation that binds public sector 
agencies14 and anti-corruption legislation that applies to public authorities and 
 
 8 University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346, 365 [96] (Lindgren, Finn and 
Bennett JJ). 
 9 See, eg, Charles Darwin University Act 2003 (NT); Griffith University Act 1998 (Qld); 
University of Adelaide Act 1971 (SA); University of Canberra Act 1989 (ACT); University of 
Melbourne Act 2009 (Vic); University of Sydney Act 1989 (NSW); University of Tasmania Act 
1992 (Tas); University of Western Australia Act 1911 (WA). Australia’s two private universities 
are also regulated by state legislation, namely, Bond University Act 1987 (Qld) and University of 
Notre Dame Australia Act 1989 (WA). The Australian National University was established by 
Australian National University Act 1991 (Cth). 
 10 University of Melbourne Act 2009 (Vic) s 5(e). See the specific aims listed in ss 5(e)(i)–(iii). 
 11 University of Western Australia Act 1911 (WA) Preamble, cited in University of Western 
Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346, 365 [96] (Lindgren, Finn and Bennett JJ). 
 12 The University of Sydney, established in 1850, was the first university to be established in 
Australia: The University of Sydney, Origins & Early Years (1850–1900) (9 April 2010) 
<http://www.usyd.edu.au/about/profile/history_origins.shtml>. 
 13 Ex parte Forster; Re University of Sydney [1963] SR 723, 727, 729 (Sugerman, Else-Mitchell 
and Moffitt JJ) (emphasis added). 
 14 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) s 20 (‘PPIPA’). Review 
jurisdiction is conferred on the New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal by PPIPA 
s 55(1). Although a number of applications have been made by students pursuant to this legisla-
tion, they have all been dismissed. See DO v University of New South Wales (GD) [2003] 
NSWADTAP 9 (31 March 2003); Vice-Chancellor Macquarie University v FM [2005] NSWCA 
192 (10 June 2005) involving the same student whose scholarship and PhD candidature were 
terminated when the University obtained information about the student’s academic history that 
had not been disclosed on his enrolment application. Clearly the student wanted the University’s 
decision to terminate his candidature to be reversed, but it is not clear that this relief is available 
either through the internal review procedures under PPIPA s 53(7) or when the conduct is re-
viewed by the New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal pursuant to PPIPA s 55(2). 
See also BE v University of Technology, Sydney [2008] NSWADT 139 (14 May 2008); VZ v 
University of Newcastle [2008] NSWADT 178 (19 June 2008). 
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public officials in that State.15 Public universities are also subject to freedom of 
information (‘FOI’) legislation applicable in every Australian jurisdiction, which 
creates general rights of access to information (in documentary form) in the 
possession of public authorities.16 As they are public institutions, complaints 
about the administrative actions of universities are subject also to investigation 
and inquiry by the parliamentary Ombudsman’s office of the relevant state or 
territory. 17  In relation to internal university disputes, Australian parliaments 
previously followed the example of England by giving exclusive jurisdiction to 
the University Visitor. Visitorial jurisdiction was expressed in the enabling 
statutes of public universities18 as lying with the Governor of the relevant state.19 
In time, a consensus emerged across almost all states and territories that visitorial 
 
 15 Independent Commission against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW) s 3. See Independent Commission 
against Corruption, Report on Investigation into the University of Newcastle’s Handling of Pla-
giarism Allegations (2005). 
 16 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT); Freedom of 
Information Act 1989 (NSW); Information Act 2002 (NT); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld); 
Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (Tas); Freedom of 
Information Act 1982 (Vic); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA). Decisions made under the 
Commonwealth legislation are reviewable by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘AAT’): 
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) s 55. In the Australian higher education sector, FOI 
applications can only be made and decisions reviewed in the AAT for the universities established 
under Commonwealth or Territory statutes. Requests to the AAT for access to information from 
universities established under Queensland statutes have therefore failed on jurisdictional 
grounds: see, eg, Luck v University of Southern Queensland (2009) 176 FCR 268, 271 [7] 
(North J); Al-Hir v University of Queensland [2009] AATA 530 (16 July 2009). Prior to the 
introduction of appeal rights to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal pursuant to 
s 119 of the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), appellants under Queensland FOI legislation 
could seek judicial review before the Supreme Court of Queensland: Al-Hir v University of 
Queensland [2009] AATA 530 (16 July 2009) [3] (Senior Member McCabe). For the majority of 
Australia’s universities incorporated under state statutes, access to information held by them is 
obtainable pursuant to the equivalent state legislation and decisions are reviewable in the appro-
priate state tribunal or forum. For example, decisions under the New South Wales FOI legislation 
are reviewable by the New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal: Freedom of Informa-
tion Act 1989 (NSW) s 53; decisions under the Victorian FOI legislation are reviewable by the 
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal: Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) s 50; deci-
sions under the Western Australian FOI legislation are reviewable by the Western Australian 
Information Commissioner: Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA) s 63. 
 17 The Australian National University, having been established under Commonwealth legislation, is 
the only university subject to the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Ombudsman pursuant to the 
Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth). 
 18 Except for those in the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory and Queensland, 
where no such statutory provision was ever made: Peregrine W F Whalley and Gillian R Evans, 
‘The University Visitor — An Unwanted Legacy of Empire or a Model of University Govern-
ance for the Future?’ (1998) 2 Macarthur Law Review 109, 121. Although it is a private univer-
sity, Bond University may appoint a Visitor with all of the powers and functions possessed by 
Visitors under the law: Bond University Act 1987 (Qld) s 14. 
 19 See, eg, Flinders University of South Australia Act 1966 (SA) s 24, which stated: ‘The Governor 
is the visitor of the University and has authority to do all things which appertain to visitors as 
often as the Governor thinks fit.’ This section was repealed by Statutes Amendment (Universities) 
Act 1999 (SA) s 4. In practice, the Visitor would usually appoint a Supreme Court judge as 
assessor to assist in the determination of petitions: 
Paradoxically, what was seen by some as mere judicial excuses to avoid having to adjudicate 
university disputes was criticised by others as a privileged short-cut by university members to 
the senior judiciary, who were invariably called upon to advise the Governor (as Visitor). 
  Mark Aronson, Bruce Dyer and Matthew Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
(Lawbook, 4th ed, 2009) 851. 
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jurisdiction was no longer appropriate and that internal university disputes that 
could not be resolved through internal mechanisms should be resolved through 
existing civil courts and tribunals.20 This view coincides with a judicial view 
that, as public institutions established by Acts of Parliament for the public 
purpose of higher education, the decisions of universities, including those of 
relevant committees, should be subject to the scrutiny of the courts.21  
Although the merits review jurisdiction of state tribunals is extensive,22 it has 
not been generally extended to administrative decisions of universities. For 
example, the argument that the New South Wales Administrative Decisions 
Tribunal has the jurisdiction once enjoyed by the University Visitor has been 
rejected.23 Unless a decision is one that the relevant state or territory tribunal24 
has jurisdiction under an enactment to review,25 it is not reviewable by that 
tribunal.26  Accordingly, the main avenue to challenge university decisions 
remains judicial review in the courts, as discussed below in Part IV. 
Although Australian universities are created by state and territory parliaments, 
it is the federal government that has primary responsibility for their funding.27 
Funding arrangements have allowed the Commonwealth to extend its control to 
universities despite the absence of constitutional power over higher education.28 
 
 20 In the United Kingdom, visitorial jurisdiction over staff disputes was ended by the Education 
Reform Act 1988 (UK) c 40, s 206. The visitorial system for hearing student complaints and 
appeals in some universities in England and Wales was superseded by Higher Education Act 
2004 (UK) c 8, pt 2, which established the Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher 
Education. 
 21 Harding v University of New South Wales [2002] NSWSC 113 (1 March 2002) [16]–[17] 
(Wood CJ at CL), although his Honour also noted that the courts will only intervene in accor-
dance with administrative law principles. See also Norrie v Senate of the University of Auckland 
[1984] 1 NZLR 129, 134–5 (Woodhouse P). 
 22 See, eg, Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) sch 2 and State Administrative 
Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) sch 1 for a list of statutes conferring jurisdiction on the relevant tribu-
nals.  
 23 Wilmshurst v Vice-Chancellor, Macquarie University [2002] NSWADT 231 (13 November 2002) 
[52]–[54] (Member Britton). 
 24 Note that general administrative review jurisdiction in South Australia lies with the Administra-
tive and Disciplinary Division of the District Court of South Australia: District Court Act 1991 
(SA) s 8; and, in Tasmania, with the Magistrates Court of Tasmania: Magistrates Court (Admin-
istrative Appeals Division) Act 2001 (Tas) s 10. 
 25 ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) s 67A; Administrative Decisions 
Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) s 38; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) s 42; 
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) s 17. See also Attorney-General (Qld), ‘Central 
Tribunal to Simplify Access to Civil and Administrative Justice’ (Ministerial Media Statement, 
17 June 2009) <http://www.cabinet.qld.gov.au/MMS/StatementDisplaySingle.aspx?id=64515> 
announcing the passage of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Bill 2009 (Qld) to 
establish the new Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal. 
 26 For a discussion of the role of state administrative tribunals, see generally: Justice Murray 
Kellam, ‘Developments in Administrative Tribunals in the Last Two Years’ (2001) 29 Federal 
Law Review 427; Robin Creyke, ‘Tribunals: Divergence and Loss’ (2001) 29 Federal Law Re-
view 403; Robin Creyke, ‘Tribunals and Access to Justice’ (2002) 2 Queensland University of 
Technology Law and Justice Journal 64; Naomi Sharp, ‘The Chameleon Tribunal: The Adminis-
trative Decisions Tribunal of New South Wales’ (2003) 10 Australian Journal of Administrative 
Law 181. 
 27 Department of Education (Cth), Employment and Workplace Relations, Higher Education 
Overview (2010) <http://www.deewr.gov.au/HigherEducation/Pages/Overview.aspx>. 
 28 For a discussion of the relevant constitutional issues, see Greg Craven, ‘Commonwealth Power 
over Higher Education: Implications and Realities’ (2006) 1 Public Policy 1; Jim Jackson, 
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For example, in return for Commonwealth financial support, universities are 
required by the Commonwealth to have rules and procedures to deal with student 
disputes and misconduct.29 The change in character of Australia’s universities 
over time has also been recognised by the courts. Modern universities may be 
characterised as ‘trading corporations’, even though they are not established for 
the purpose of trading, and even though that description could not have been 
applied at the time of their creation.30 Consequently, Australian universities are 
also subject to federal legislation applicable to ‘constitutional corporations’.31  
The Federal Court of Australia undoubtedly has jurisdiction in student–
university disputes involving federal matters but it may not be the most appro-
priate judicial forum to resolve student disputes that also involve non-federal 
matters. Some of the cases discussed below in Part IV illustrate the jurisdictional 
problems that have arisen when students have sought relief in the Federal Court.  
Problems have also arisen when students have sought relief in the Administra-
tive Appeals Tribunal (‘AAT’), which was established by the Commonwealth to 
provide independent merits review of administrative decisions made by Austra-
lian government officials, authorities and other tribunals.32 Like its state counter-
parts, the AAT does not have a general power to review any decision made under 
Commonwealth legislation; it can only review a decision if an Act specifically 
provides that the decision is reviewable by the AAT.33 Consequently, the AAT 
has no jurisdiction to hear students’ general grievances about their courses if 
 
‘Commonwealth Controls over Australian Schools, TAFEs and Universities via Tied Funding: 
Time for Constitutional Reform?’ (2008) 13(2) Australia & New Zealand Journal of Law & 
Education 101. 
 29 Required by the Higher Education Support Act 2003 (Cth) s 19-45 and the Education Services 
for Overseas Students Act 2000 (Cth) s 38(b). 
 30 Quickenden v O’Connor (2001) 109 FCR 243, 261 [51] (Black CJ and French J). However, it has 
also been held that engaging in commercial activities does not necessarily displace the traditional 
public functions of universities in favour of the pursuit of commercial purposes: University of 
Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346, 388 [184] (Lindgren, Finn and Bennett JJ). As 
noted above, a discussion of litigation involving universities and their staff is beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
 31 For example, Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), considered in Quickenden v O’Connor (2001) 
109 FCR 243; Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), considered in Fennell v Australian National 
University [1999] FCA 989 (22 July 1999). For a discussion of the application of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) to universities, see, eg, Francine Rorke, ‘The Application of the Con-
sumer Protection Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) to Universities’ (1996) 12 
Queensland University of Technology Law Journal 176; Jim Jackson, ‘The Marketing of Univer-
sity Courses under Sections 52 and 53 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)’ (2002) 6 Southern 
Cross University Law Review 106; Philip H Clarke, ‘University Marketing and the Law: Apply-
ing the Trade Practices Act to Universities’ Marketing and Promotional Activities’ (2003) 8 
Deakin Law Review 304; Judith Bessant, ‘Legal Issues in Higher Education and the Trade Prac-
tices Act’ (2004) 26 Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management 251; Lynden Griggs, 
‘Tertiary Education, the Market and Liability “in Trade or Commerce”’ (2004) 12 Competition & 
Consumer Law Journal 64; Patty Kamvounias and Sally Varnham, ‘Getting What They Paid for 
— Consumer Rights of Students in Higher Education’ (2006) 15 Griffith Law Review 306. 
 32 See Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 5. The AAT was one element of the 
Commonwealth’s administrative law ‘package’ that also included the Ombudsman Act 1976 
(Cth), the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘ADJR Act’) and the 
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). 
 33 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 25. 
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students cannot precisely identify the decision of which review is sought.34 Even 
when a university decision can be identified, legislation must also be identified 
that provides for review by the AAT. For example, Marcia Pinheiro failed in her 
attempt to have the AAT review decisions of the University of Queensland 
regarding her academic transcript and the award made to her upon completion of 
her studies because she was unable to point to any provision in the University of 
Queensland Act 1998 (Qld) or any other Queensland or Commonwealth legisla-
tion giving the AAT jurisdiction to review decisions of the University.35 It is not 
surprising that the AAT had no review jurisdiction given that the University was 
constituted by state legislation, but, strangely, no such jurisdiction had been 
conferred on a state tribunal either.36 
The complexities inherent in a higher education sector that is subject to both 
state and Commonwealth regulation in a federal legal system are made manifest 
when disputes arise that are not able to be resolved internally. In the next section, 
an outline is given of the various means by which student–university disputes 
may currently be resolved without external recourse. This is followed by a 
detailed analysis of the student–university matters dealt with by various courts 
and tribunals. 
I I I   RE S O LV I N G  ST U D E N T DI S P U T E S  W I T H O U T RE C O U R S E  TO  
CO U RT S  A N D  TR I B U N A L S 
A  The University Visitor  
The office of the University Visitor ‘has a long tradition’,37 with its origins in 
ecclesiastical law; it has evolved with the development of eleemosynary corpora-
tions, ‘particularly the colleges within the universities of Oxford and Cambridge 
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries’.38 In Philips v Bury, the Court referred to 
the exclusive role of the Visitor ‘to judge according to the statutes and rules of 
the college’.39 
Although all internal university disputes were once subject to visitorial juris-
diction,40 the extent of this jurisdiction was often in dispute.41 A law student 
 
 34 Pineiro v Australian Catholic University Ltd [2006] AATA 371 (28 April 2006) [23] (Deputy 
President Purvis). Sergio Pineiro’s grievances related to his failure of a subject, his claims that 
illness hindered his studies, that the University did not assist him, and also that he was refused 
credit for studies at other universities. 
 35 Pinheiro v University of Queensland [2006] AATA 1053 (8 December 2006) [14] (Deputy 
President Forgie). 
 36 The failure to confer jurisdiction with respect to universities on state and territory merits review 
bodies appears to be at odds with the growth of merits review in other areas. See above n 25 and 
accompanying text.  
 37 Re Petition to Dame Roma Mitchell AC DBE (Visitor of the Flinders University of South 
Australia) (1992) 57 SASR 573, 573 (Debelle J). 
 38 Peregrine Whalley and David Price, ‘The University Visitor in Western Australia’ (1995) 25 
University of Western Australia Law Review 146, 147. 
 39 (1694) Skin 447, 484; 90 ER 198, 217 (Holt CJ). 
 40 Including, for example, student grievances about refused admission: M v The University of 
Tasmania [1986] Tas R 74; the failure to award an honours degree: Re Petition to Dame Roma 
Mitchell AC DBE (Visitor of the Flinders University of South Australia) (1992) 57 SASR 573; 
the revocation of a degree: Re La Trobe University; Ex parte Hazan [1993] 1 VR 7; staff disputes 
 
     
148 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 34 
 
     
suspended from The University of Melbourne in 1983 for unsatisfactory progress 
challenged the decision in the Supreme Court of Victoria but failed when the 
Court confirmed that the Visitor42 had exclusive jurisdiction in such matters.43 In 
1990, a PhD student successfully petitioned the Visitor at The University of 
Newcastle when her candidature was wrongfully terminated. The student then 
applied to the Supreme Court of New South Wales for an order quashing the 
compensation award made by the Visitor.44 The Court accepted the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Visitor; however, as an error of law had been made in the 
calculation of the amount to be awarded to the student, the Court exercised its 
supervisory function and remitted the matter to the Visitor to assess damages in 
accordance with general law principles.45  
Legislation was eventually passed to abolish all but the ceremonial functions 
of the Visitor in all university Acts in New South Wales.46 The New South Wales 
government was concerned about ‘the undesirable consequences of the develop-
ment … of an alternate jurisdiction to that of the civil courts’, the ‘growing 
burden upon the office of the Governor’,47 and the deficiencies in the jurisdiction 
described as follows in the second reading speech: 
first, the jurisdiction is inappropriate when exercised in relation to a modern 
publicly funded university established by statute, rather than an historical insti-
tution established by a donor, charity or religious dignitary; second, the extent 
 
concerning study leave: Murdoch University v Bloom [1980] WAR 193; termination for miscon-
duct: Re La Trobe University; Ex parte Wild [1987] VR 447; and dismissal from the position of 
Head of School: Re Macquarie University; Ex parte Ong (1989) 17 NSWLR 113. 
 41 See T G Matthews, ‘The Office of the University Visitor’ (1980) 11 University of Queensland 
Law Journal 152; Robert J Sadler, ‘The University Visitor: Visitatorial Precedent and Procedure 
in Australia’ (1981) 7 University of Tasmania Law Review 2; S Robinson, ‘The Office of Visitor 
of an Eleemosynary Corporation: Some Ancient and Modern Principles’ (1994) 18 University of 
Queensland Law Journal 106; Whalley and Evans, above n 18. 
 42 At the time, Melbourne University Act 1958 (Vic) s 47 provided that the Governor was the 
Visitor of the University and ‘shall have authority to do all things which appertain to visitors as 
often as to him seems meet’: Re University of Melbourne; Ex parte De Simone [1981] VR 378, 
385 (Sir Winneke). 
 43 Vujanovic v University of Melbourne (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Beach J, 11 March 
1983), referred to in Sean McLaughlin, ‘The University Visitor’ (1983) 8 Legal Service Bulletin 
140. It is interesting to compare the approach taken by the New Zealand Court of Appeal, where 
Woodhouse P stated he had ‘great difficulty in understanding why it should be thought that 
wherever the Visitor is able to act the actual jurisdiction of the Courts has been ousted’, particu-
larly when ‘[universities] have been established by act of Parliament as public institutions to 
promote public purposes, in this case higher education, and largely with public funds. And for 
that important reason alone … should be subject to public scrutiny in the courts’: Norrie v Senate 
of the University of Auckland [1984] 1 NZLR 129, 134–5. The scope of the jurisdiction of the 
Visitor also raised some difficult issues for courts in the United Kingdom: see, eg, Thorne v 
University of London [1966] 2 QB 237; Hines v Birkbeck College [1986] Ch 524; Thomas v 
University of Bradford [1987] AC 795; R v Lord President of the Privy Council; Ex parte Page 
[1993] AC 682. See also Tim Kaye, ‘Academic Judgement, the University Visitor and the Human 
Rights Act 1998’ (1999) 11 Education and the Law 165. 
 44 Bayley-Jones v University of Newcastle (1990) 22 NSWLR 424.  
 45 Ibid. 
 46 University Legislation (Amendment) Act 1994 (NSW). See, eg, University of Newcastle Act 1989 
(NSW) s 13. 
 47 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 20 April 1994, 1545 (Kerry 
Chikarovski, Minister for Industrial Relations and Employment, and Minister for the Status of 
Women). 
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of the jurisdiction is unclear, not having been tested at law, particularly in rela-
tion to whether the jurisdiction is exclusive and the powers which may be exer-
cised by the Visitor; third, the jurisdiction is incompatible with the general law 
applying to institutions and individuals in New South Wales and there are 
doubts and anomalies surrounding the question of appeals following a decision 
by the Visitor; fourth, exercise of the jurisdiction has led to unwelcome promi-
nence being given to decisions of the Visitor; fifth, owing to the complexity of 
many of the cases brought to the Visitor, there has been a need for costly legal 
representation by both parties as well as the need for formal and informal legal 
advice and assistance for the Governor on the part of Crown law officers.48 
The Tasmanian government’s concerns about the jurisdiction of the Visitor also 
resulted in legislation limiting the role of the Visitor to ceremonial functions 
only,49 with the rationale being expressed in the following terms: 
the jurisdiction of the Visitor … has been causing concern … to all State Gov-
ernors and other States have removed similar provisions that did not necessarily 
add anything to the justice because there are still plenty of other opportunities 
of appeal for people, such as the Anti-discrimination Commissioner, the Om-
budsman and a number of areas.50 
Similar legislation in Victoria was preceded by a review of university govern-
ance to which the government responded by recommending strengthening 
student grievance procedures51 and noting that: 
[the Visitor] is rarely used and there is little evidence to suggest that this situa-
tion is likely to change. In actual fact students and staff with grievances at uni-
versity decisions are usually satisfied by the university’s own appeal mecha-
nisms. Where this is not the case the aggrieved person has recourse to the Vic-
torian Ombudsman, and where it has jurisdiction to the Victorian Civil Admin-
istrative Appeals Tribunal.52 
The University of Melbourne Act 2009 (Vic) now provides that the office of 
the Visitor resides in the Governor,53 but that the role is limited to ‘ceremonial 
functions’ only.54 
In South Australia, the Visitor came to be viewed as ‘an archaic office … 
[without] … a place in modern universities … [it being] more effective for 
disputes to be resolved by means such as the Ombudsman or other civil mecha-
nisms’.55 As it was not considered necessary to have legislation for universities 
 
 48 Ibid. 
 49 University of Tasmania Act 1992 (Tas) s 17, as amended by University of Tasmania Amendment 
Act 2001 (Tas) s 11. 
 50 Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 10 April 2001, 48 (Paula Wriedt, 
Minister for Education). 
 51 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 1 May 2003, 1320 (Lynne Kosky, 
Minister for Education and Training). 
 52 Ibid 1322. 
 53 University of Melbourne Act 2009 (Vic) s 22(1). 
 54 Ibid s 22(3). 
 55 South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 29 September 1999, 32 (Malcolm 
Buckby, Minister for Education, Children’s Services and Training). 
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to continue to call on the Governor for ceremonial functions,56 the sections in 
each university Act that provided for the Governor to be the Visitor were 
repealed.57  
Although doubts have also been expressed about the utility of the office of the 
University Visitor in Western Australia,58 the traditional office still exists in that 
State.59 
With the demise of the dispute resolution jurisdiction of the University Visitor, 
students who do not wish to resort to courts or tribunals for the resolution of their 
grievances may request that the matter be investigated by parliamentary Om-
budsmen. In addition, a number of universities now also have internal student 
Ombudsmen (which are generally based on the public administration model) 
with jurisdiction to investigate and make recommendations on student com-
plaints relating to procedure.60 
B  Parliamentary Ombudsmen 
Each of the nine parliamentary Ombudsman offices across Australia has some 
involvement in student–university complaint handling. In four jurisdictions, the 
Ombudsman handles complaints from just one university 61  so the relevant 
university effectively has its own dedicated external independent review body. In 
three jurisdictions, the Ombudsman has the authority to investigate and inquire 
into the actions of 25 universities62 so it is not surprising that the Ombudsmen in 
these states have been the most active in this area. All annual reports to parlia-
ments from Ombudsman offices include some information about university 
complaints for the relevant year but this is usually limited to the number of 
matters lodged with the relevant office without any details about the source or 
type of complaint (apart from one or two case studies selected for inclusion in 
the annual report).63 Significantly, the annual reports generally do not identify 
either the complainant or the university involved, so, as with visitorial jurisdic-
tion, little information is publicly available about the resolution of these matters. 
Occasionally, Ombudsman offices have submitted special reports to Parliament 
 
 56 Ibid.  
 57 Statutes Amendment (Universities) Act 1999 (SA) s 4. 
 58 Sir Francis Burt, ‘The University Visitor’ (Speech delivered at the University of Western 
Australia Convocation, Perth, 18 March 1994), cited in David M Price and Peregrine 
W F Whalley, ‘The University Visitor and University Governance’ (1996) 18 Journal of Higher 
Education Policy and Management 45, 53. 
 59 See University of Western Australia Act 1911 (WA) s 7(1). For similar provisions, see also Curtin 
University of Technology Act 1966 (WA) s 27; Murdoch University Act 1973 (WA) s 9; Edith 
Cowan University Act 1984 (WA) s 42. 
 60 For example, University of Technology, Sydney; La Trobe University; Queensland University of 
Technology and Central Queensland University. 
 61 The Commonwealth, Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory and Tasmania. 
 62 New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria. 
 63 See, eg, Queensland Ombudsman, Annual Report 2007–2008 (2008), which indicates that 130 
complaints about universities were received in that year (an increase of 15 per cent since 2006–
07), but details are provided for only one case study, which dealt with foreign student tuition 
fees: at 44–5. 
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about their investigations of universities64 and have published ‘fact sheets’ of 
relevance to the higher education sector.65 
While a comprehensive analysis of matters which find their way to the offices 
of parliamentary Ombudsmen is outside the parameters of this article, it is 
significant that in April 2005, seven Ombudsmen wrote a joint letter to the Editor 
of Australia’s national newspaper expressing their concern about the increasing 
number of complaints involving universities coming to their offices, the com-
plexity of those complaints and the standard of university dispute handling.66 In 
addition, both the Victorian and the New South Wales Ombudsmen in 2005 and 
2006 specifically reported concern at this trend, finding it necessary to review 
complaint handling at universities and, in the case of the New South Wales 
Ombudsman, to issue best practice guidelines.67 
The increase in recourse to these offices raises the question as to whether it is 
still appropriate for student complaint matters to be included within the current 
public administration model. If it is not, should a dedicated higher education 
Ombudsman be established in Australia along the lines of the Office of the 
Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education (‘OIA’), which resolves disputes 
between students and universities in England and Wales?68 
C  Student Ombudsmen within Universities 
A significant number of Australian universities now have internal Ombudsmen, 
variously known as Ombuds, Ombudsmen, Student Ombudsmen69 and Deans of 
Students.70 Generally the model follows that of the parliamentary Ombudsman, 
in that it is an avenue of ‘last resort’ and investigatory in function. The office is 
generally held by university academics whose function is to independently 
review university decision-making to ensure that there has been adherence to 
university processes and procedures. An alternative model, based more on an 
advisory and conciliatory function, is provided by the office of the Dean of 
Students at The Australian National University and the Australian Catholic 
University. Clearly, while students are advised of the existence of these offices, 
 
 64 See, eg, Ombudsman Victoria, An Investigation into a Complaint about Preferential Treatment of 
a Student by The University of Melbourne (2002). 
 65 See, eg, Ombudsman Victoria, Fact Sheet 17 — Overseas Students and the Role of the Ombuds-
man (2009). 
 66 Barbour et al, above n 2. 
 67 Ombudsman Victoria, Review of Complaint Handling in Victorian Universities (2005); New 
South Wales Ombudsman, Complaint Handling at Universities: Best Practices Guidelines 
(2006). 
 68 See generally Olliffe and Stuhmcke, above n 2. The OIA was designated by the Secretary of 
State to be the responsible body pursuant to the Higher Education Act 2004 (UK) c 8, ss (5)(b), 
13(1). It is important to note, however, the case of R (Siborurema) v Office of the Independent 
Adjudicator for Higher Education [2007] EWCA Civ 1365 (20 December 2007), in which the 
Court of Appeal held that decisions of the OIA are subject to judicial review but that the scope of 
any such review should be limited. Although it is still early days for the OIA in the United King-
dom, there is much merit in the argument that this institution should be keenly watched. 
 69 For example, the University of Technology, Sydney; Queensland University of Technology; 
The University of Newcastle and Monash University. 
 70 For example, Australian Catholic University and The Australian National University. 
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there is no compulsion on them to request their assistance. While the annual 
reports of these Ombudsmen detail significant numbers of investigations 
conducted annually, without further research it serves little purpose to speculate 
as to the effectiveness of these offices in preventing litigation.71 The existence of 
Ombudsmen within universities could provide grounds for a court to refuse relief 
on discretionary grounds to those students who failed to first use such internal 
processes before seeking redress in the courts.72 
IV  RE S O LV I N G  ST U D E N T DI S P U T E S  I N  CO U RT S  A N D  TR I B U N A L S 
Having university policies and processes to deal with student complaints and 
having recourse to parliamentary Ombudsmen to review internal procedures does 
not prevent students from seeking relief in courts and tribunals.  
This is clearly illustrated by the story of an international student, Megumi 
Ogawa. Ogawa was originally enrolled in a doctorate in the School of Law at 
The University of Queensland but subsequently transferred her candidature to 
The University of Melbourne. She encountered problems with the supervision 
arrangements at The University of Melbourne and when she was unable to 
complete her degree in the time allocated, the University refused to extend the 
time for completion. Ogawa sought relief pursuant to the University’s internal 
grievance and appeals procedures but remained dissatisfied. She also brought the 
matter to the attention of the Victorian Ombudsman and complained that the 
University had not complied with the requirements of the Educational Services 
for Overseas Students Act 2000 (Cth) in terms of support to complete her studies 
and resolve her complaints.73 Again, she was dissatisfied with the outcome and 
commenced proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia alleging breach of 
contract, negligence and misleading or deceptive conduct on the part of the 
University with respect to her undertaking a PhD. Marshall J ordered that the 
proceedings be transferred to the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia74 and an 
application to transfer the proceedings back to the Federal Court was dis-
missed.75 The University’s motion to have the amended statement of claim — 
that included additional allegations of unconscionable conduct, breach of natural 
justice and defamation — struck out was largely successful, but Ogawa was 
given leave to file and serve a further amended statement of claim with respect to 
 
 71 Further research in this area is being undertaken by the authors. 
 72 In R (Peng Hu Shi) v King’s College London [2008] EWHC (Admin) 857 (9 April 2008) [45]–
[46], Mitting J, in dismissing a student’s application for judicial review of a disciplinary decision 
that resulted in the student’s expulsion, stated that ‘[j]udicial review is a remedy of last not first 
resort … [and as the claimant] did not, as she should have done, pursue her complaint to the 
Office of the Independent Adjudicator … it is not appropriate, and was never appropriate, to 
bring this claim for judicial review’. 
 73 See generally Megumi Ogawa, ‘University Grievance Handling for Overseas Students: ESOS Act 
and the National Code’ (2003) 10 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 162; A D Gilbert, 
‘Response from The University of Melbourne’ (2003) 11 Australian Journal of Administrative 
Law 44. 
 74 Ogawa v University of Melbourne [2004] FCA 491 (26 April 2004). 
 75 Ogawa v University of Melbourne [2004] FMCA 515 (27 July 2004). 
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the allegations of breach of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).76 This she failed 
to do. She also failed to appear on the date fixed for hearing and so her applica-
tion was dismissed77 and costs were ordered against her.78 Ogawa tried again in 
the Federal Court, but, although she raised some additional issues, the proceed-
ings were essentially the same as in the Federal Magistrates Court action. Ryan J 
therefore stayed the proceedings until further order noting that it is 
vexatious to require a respondent in the position of the University to fight si-
multaneously on two different fronts, each in a different court. It is no answer 
for an applicant who seeks to create that situation to point out that the battle 
lines have been drawn somewhat differently in each court.79 
Ogawa’s experience also shows the seriousness of the consequences that may 
follow unsuccessful litigation regarding adverse university decisions.80  
Although Ogawa made a number of allegations against the University, she did 
not seek judicial review of the relevant decision-making process. Had she 
commenced proceedings in the appropriate state court, jurisdiction would not 
have been in issue.81 As the New South Wales Supreme Court has noted:  
[the Court] does not sit as a Court of factual review over decisions of … [uni-
versity] committees … [but] it can … intervene in accordance with accepted 
administrative law principles, for example where the Committee has not been 
properly constituted, where it failed to follow proper procedure, where it acted 
in a way constituting a denial of natural justice, where it otherwise reached a 
decision which was contrary to law, or where its decision was such that no rea-
sonable committee, acting with a due appreciation of its responsibility, could 
have arrived at it.82 
It is important to note that in Australia, judicial review is available both under 
the common law and pursuant to judicial review legislation.83 Common law 
 
 76 Ogawa v University of Melbourne [No 3] [2004] FMCA 536 (3 September 2004). 
 77 Ogawa v University of Melbourne [2005] FMCA 1118 (8 August 2005). 
 78 Ogawa v University of Melbourne [No 2] [2005] FMCA 1216 (18 August 2005). 
 79 Ogawa v University of Melbourne (2005) 220 ALR 659, 677–8 [87]. 
 80 Ogawa was also involved in legal proceedings regarding her student visa: Ogawa v Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2006) 156 FCR 246. Between 19 May and 28 July 2006, 
Ogawa was detained at the Villawood Immigration Detention Centre. Her failed application for 
waiver of expenses and fees incurred during her detention was subject to an unsuccessful claim 
for judicial review: Ogawa v Colbeck [No 2] [2007] FMCA 2127 (5 December 2007). In early 
2008, Ogawa sought judicial review in the Supreme Court of Queensland of a decision relating 
to the grant of legal aid for her representation in criminal proceedings listed in the District Court. 
That application was also dismissed: Ogawa v Briggs [2008] QSC 18 (25 January 2008). 
 81 There were no jurisdictional issues, for example, where state supreme courts were asked to apply 
principles of natural justice to review university decisions to exclude students for academic 
misconduct: Simjanoski v La Trobe University [2004] VSC 180 (27 May 2004); or for failing 
course requirements: Jenkins v Charles Sturt University [2008] NSWSC 50 (13 February 2008). 
This is because of the unlimited jurisdiction of state supreme courts: see, eg, Supreme Court Act 
1970 (NSW) s 23; Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 85(1). 
 82 Harding v University of New South Wales [2002] NSWSC 113 (1 March 2002) [17] (Wood CJ at 
CL). 
 83 See, eg, Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT); Judicial Review Act 1991 
(Qld); Judicial Review Act 2000 (Tas); Administrative Law Act 1978 (Vic). State and territory 
judicial review legislation is modelled on the ADJR Act. 
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judicial review focuses on the legality of administrative action, whereas judicial 
review legislation applies more narrowly to administrative decisions. Nonethe-
less, judicial review statutes are  
seen largely as conferring procedural advantages over the older powers exer-
cised in the courts’ inherent jurisdiction, which they supplement, rather than re-
place … [and they] confer a right to reasons for administrative decisions where 
none exists at common law, and expand the grounds of judicial review, but not 
their essential characteristics.84 
Students challenging adverse university decisions in the courts have had no 
problem satisfying the courts that they have inherent jurisdiction to review such 
decisions, but they have had difficulties when relying on judicial review legisla-
tion. This is indicated in the discussion of the case law that follows. 
A  Judicial Review under Statutory Regimes 
The Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘ADJR Act’) 
allows ‘a person aggrieved by a decision’ to apply to the Federal Court or 
Federal Magistrates Court for an order of review in respect of the decision85 and 
to request a written statement of reasons in relation to the decision.86 In a similar 
way, the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) (‘QJR Act’) allows ‘a person aggrieved 
by a decision’87 to apply to the Supreme Court of Queensland for a statutory 
order of review in respect of the decision88 and to request a written statement of 
reasons in relation to the decision.89 However, the ADJR Act and the QJR Act 
only apply to certain types of decisions, namely, decisions of ‘an administrative 
character’ that were made ‘under an enactment’.90  
A decision of the Board of Patent Attorneys that a candidate had failed exami-
nations in two subjects was held to be a decision of ‘an administrative character’ 
within the meaning of the ADJR Act. Fox ACJ commented that: 
The role of the Board of Examiners is one of carrying out a purpose of the Pat-
ents Act by ensuring that there are specially qualified people to deal with appli-
cations that arise under it. The process of arranging for, and promulgating the 
results of, examinations are, on any view, distinctly administrative, as are some 
aspects of conducting them.91 
 
 84 Aronson, Dyer and Groves, above n 19, 22–3. 
 85 ADJR Act s 5. 
 86 Ibid s 13. 
 87 QJR Act s 7. 
 88 Ibid s 20. 
 89 Ibid s 32. 
 90 Ibid s 4; ADJR Act s 3 (definition of ‘decision to which this Act applies’). The meaning of this 
phrase was also considered in litigation involving staff members requesting reasons for certain 
university decisions. See Australian National University v Burns (1982) 43 ALR 25 (request for 
reasons for decision to terminate professorial appointment); Australian National University v 
Lewins (1996) 68 FCR 87 (request for reasons for decision not to promote employee). 
 91 Evans v Friemann (1981) 35 ALR 428, 435. 
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Although matters concerning examinations by public bodies had not been subject 
to judicial review previously, Fox ACJ was not prepared to consider whether the 
court would decline jurisdiction in a university case.92 
Students may be persons aggrieved by adverse university decisions of ‘an 
administrative character’ but a series of cases illustrates the problems that have 
arisen when students have argued that the adverse university decision was made 
‘under an enactment’. It is this requirement that has caused students the most 
difficulty. 
A law student at the University of Tasmania failed in his attempt to have the 
Federal Court of Australia review a decision of the University’s Discipline 
Appeals Committee because, as the decision had been made by a committee 
established under the University of Tasmania Act 1992 (Tas) and had not been 
made under federal legislation, it was not made ‘under an enactment’ for the 
purposes of the ADJR Act.93 When a student applied under the QJR Act to the 
Supreme Court of Queensland to review a decision of Bond University, 
Dowsett J held that the QJR Act did not apply because the respondent university 
was not a public university. In a privately-owned university, the source of 
regulations and the relationship between the University and its students were to 
be found in the law of contract and not ‘under an enactment’.94 
The QJR Act has also been held not to apply to certain decisions of Griffith 
University, even though it is a public university established under the Griffith 
University Act 1998 (Qld) (‘Griffith University Act’). The Supreme Court of 
Queensland found, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that there was no basis for 
review under the QJR Act of a decision to fail a student in two subjects, because 
decisions about academic assessment are not decisions made ‘under an enact-
ment’.95 The same courts later considered that a decision to exclude a PhD 
student for academic misconduct was reviewable under the QJR Act.96 An appeal 
to the High Court found otherwise when a majority of 4:197 held that the student 
was not entitled to review under the QJR Act because the relevant decision was 
not made under, nor did it take legal force or effect from, the Griffith University 
 
 92 Ibid. 
 93 Mazukov v University of Tasmania [2000] FCA 1091 (4 August 2000); Mazukov v University of 
Tasmania [2002] FCAFC 166 (31 May 2002). The student then sought special leave to appeal to 
the High Court but abandoned that application and was subsequently involved in further litiga-
tion in relation to the costs orders associated with the proceedings: Mazukov v University of 
Tasmania [2003] FCA 253 (19 March 2003); Mazukov v University of Tasmania [2004] FCAFC 
159 (17 June 2004). Having been unsuccessful in the Federal Court of Australia on jurisdictional 
grounds, the student then sought relief in the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal of Tasmania alleging 
discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, race and imputed disability. The student was again 
unsuccessful as he was unable to provide evidence of discriminatory conduct: Mazukov v Uni-
versity of Tasmania [2004] TASADT 8 (5 August 2004); Mazukov v University of Tasmania 
[2005] TASADT 5 (5 May 2005). 
 94 Orr v Bond University (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Dowsett J, 3 April 1996). 
 95 Ivins v Griffith University [2001] QSC 86 (29 March 2001); Ivins v Griffith University [2001] 
QCA 393 (19 September 2001). 
 96 Tang v Griffith University [2003] QSC 22 (14 February 2003); Tang v Griffith University [2003] 
QCA 571 (19 December 2003). 
 97 Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ (Kirby J dissenting). 
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Act.98 As a leading commentator has noted, ‘[w]hat sank her case was that the 
University’s Code was soft law — it was neither primary nor subordinate 
legislation’99 and so could not be said to be made ‘under an enactment’. 
The High Court noted that nothing in the Griffith University Act dealt specifi-
cally with admission to or exclusion from a research program, academic miscon-
duct, or procedures dealing with such cases.100 These powers flowed from a 
general description in the Griffith University Act of the University’s functions, its 
general powers and the powers of the University Council, including the Coun-
cil’s powers of delegation.101 Consequently, in the view of the majority, the 
power to affect the student’s rights and obligations derived, not from the enact-
ment, but from the general law, and from such agreement as had been made 
between the parties.102 This case, one of the few involving students and universi-
ties to have reached the High Court of Australia,103 has generated a huge amount 
of commentary and criticism in both academic and non-academic circles about 
the consequences of the majority view.104  
So what of applications made under the common law — do students fare 
better? 
B  Judicial Review under the Common Law 
1 Student Challenges to Decisions about Admission 
Judicial opinion confirms that universities may determine entry requirements 
and standards in their courses.105 In exercising their functions, it has also been 
noted that universities: 
 
 98 Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99. 
 99 Mark Aronson, ‘Private Bodies, Public Power and Soft Law in the High Court’ (2007) 35 
Federal Law Review 1, 12–13. 
100 Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99, 106 [8] (Gleeson CJ). 
101 Griffith University Act ss 5–11. 
102 Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99, 112 [23] (Gleeson CJ), 131 [99] (Gummow, 
Callinan and Heydon JJ). It has been noted that ‘[t]he same result would have been on the cards 
if the University rules which Ms Tang alleged were broken had been contractual’: Aronson, 
above n 99, 13. This may explain why Tang did not plead a contractual relationship with the 
university but it does not explain why she did not seek common law judicial review. 
103 See also R v The University of Sydney; Ex parte Drummond (1943) 67 CLR 95 (on whether the 
defence power allowed the Commonwealth to regulate admission to universities); The University 
of Wollongong v Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447 (on the inconsistency between Commonwealth 
and state laws relating to racial discrimination). 
104 See, eg, Aronson, Dyer and Groves, above n 19, 79–87; Melissa Gangemi, ‘Griffith University v 
Tang: Review of University Decisions Made “under an Enactment”’ (2005) 27 Sydney Law 
Review 567; Patty Kamvounias and Sally Varnham, ‘Doctoral Dreams Destroyed: Does Griffith 
University v Tang Spell the End of Judicial Review of Australian University Decisions?’ (2005) 
10(1) Australia & New Zealand Journal of Law & Education 5; Daniel Stewart, ‘Griffith Uni-
versity v Tang, “under an Enactment” and Limiting Access to Judicial Review’ (2005) 33 Fed-
eral Law Review 525; Anthony E Cassimatis, ‘Statutory Judicial Review and the Requirement of 
a Statutory Effect on Rights or Obligations: “Decisions under an Enactment”’ (2006) 13 Austra-
lian Journal of Administrative Law 169; Aronson, above n 99; P A Keane, ‘Judicial Review: The 
Courts and the Academy’ (2008) 82 Australian Law Journal 623. 
105 Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99, 109 [15] (Gleeson CJ): 
The functions of the … [university] include providing education, providing facilities for study 
and research, and conferring higher education awards. Its powers include the power to do any-
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must engage in processes of assessment to satisfy themselves that candidates 
for admission are qualified and reasonably capable of undertaking courses. 
Having passed that threshold, universities must then make (often hard) deci-
sions about who among the candidates will be offered places and be the subject 
of the commitment of resources.106 
The courts are well aware that students may need to compete for a place in 
their desired course and that some students will fall short of the rank required for 
admission. In Harding v University of New South Wales judicial notice has been 
taken, for example, of the fact that: 
competition for enrolment in the Faculty of Medicine is intense … [as] reflected 
in the high admission standards … [and the fact] that the study of medicine re-
quires considerable dedication and academic ability [and] … [f]or these reasons 
the competition for places is based on academic merit.107 
For many years, Kathleen Harding tried and failed to gain admission to a 
medical degree at The University of New South Wales. Her many attempts to use 
the law to gain admission were also ultimately unsuccessful. She first enrolled in 
the Faculty of Medicine in February 1983 but, due to ill health, was unable to 
complete her first year of studies. Over the next few years, although she passed 
some subjects, her academic record indicated that she had repeatedly discontin-
ued and then re-enrolled in the course. In 1988, she was asked to show cause as 
to why she should be entitled to re-enrol. Her application was rejected and the 
University’s Appeal Committee excluded her for two years.108 In 1997, Harding 
applied to enrol once more but once again this application was unsuccessful, as 
was her Supreme Court challenge to this decision. 109  Her applications for 
admission in 2000 and 2001 were also refused. Harding went back to the 
Supreme Court seeking orders that the university enrol her in the Faculty of 
Medicine for 2002 but this action was dismissed.110 On 30 November 2001, 
Harding again applied for enrolment. She provided further documentation 
asserting that her failures in previous years were due to medical problems, which 
had finally been overcome, and alleging breaches by the University of principles 
of administrative law, particularly that the University had acted in a manner 
 
thing necessary or convenient in connection with its functions. Subject to any other legal con-
straint, it may establish a PhD research programme, and decide who will participate in the pro-
gramme and on what terms and conditions. 
106 DO v University of New South Wales (GD) [2003] NSWADTAP 9 (31 March 2003) [16] 
(O’Connor DCJ, Members Montgomery and Antonios). 
107 [2002] NSWSC 113 (1 March 2002) [47] (Wood CJ at CL). 
108 On 17 December 1993, the New South Wales Court of Appeal found that the Appeal Commit-
tee’s decision was invalid as the Appeal Committee was improperly constituted when it excluded 
her. However, it declined to grant relief as it would be pointless to order the Appeal Committee 
to re-hear a 1989 application for enrolment: see the outline of circumstances in Harding v Uni-
versity of New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 325 (25 September 2002) [21] (Hodgson JA). In 
1995, she commenced Supreme Court proceedings claiming damages in respect of the Appeal 
Committee’s decision but these proceedings were summarily dismissed: Harding v University of 
New South Wales [2001] NSWSC 301 (12 April 2001). 
109 Bruce J dismissed these proceedings on 27 February 1998: see outline of circumstances in 
Harding v University of New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 325 (25 September 2002) [23] (Hodg-
son JA). 
110 Harding v University of New South Wales [2001] NSWSC 1198 (29 November 2001). 
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which was procedurally irregular and that it had acted unreasonably. This legal 
action was also dismissed as Harding was unable to substantiate the allega-
tions.111 The New South Wales Court of Appeal confirmed that ‘it is imperative 
that … [a university] has power to select the best students so long as it does not 
contravene its statute as to discrimination.’112 
A decade earlier, the Supreme Court of New South Wales was asked to con-
sider whether The University of Sydney and The University of New South Wales 
had failed to comply with their own admission requirements that converted 
interstate matriculation marks into the ‘equivalent’ in terms of the New South 
Wales Higher School Certificate results. In Sweeney v The University of Syd-
ney,113  the plaintiff, who had completed his secondary school education in 
Victoria and had gained entry to study law at a university in that State, argued 
that he should be given the same ranking in New South Wales as he had been 
given in Victoria. The plaintiff was denied enrolment in the combined law 
courses at the defendant universities as they had their own ranking system which 
resulted in the plaintiff receiving a ranking below that required for the relevant 
courses. The action was dismissed by Sully J as there had been no error of law 
and the plaintiff had not made out a case for the relief he sought.114 
The courts have recognised that not only must a university determine the 
provision of educational and research facilities and uphold academic standards, 
but it must also necessarily do so ‘within the limits of its resources.’115 Orr v 
Bond University 116  resulted from a student’s failed application to undertake 
supervised research leading to a Master of Arts. The sub-Dean of the School of 
Humanities and Social Sciences wrote to Orr telling him he could not undertake 
research in his chosen field because the School did not have permanent staff to 
supervise his research. Nonetheless, Orr commenced legal proceedings in the 
Supreme Court of Queensland seeking reasons be given for that decision 
pursuant to the QJR Act. As discussed above, that action failed because the 
respondent was a private university; however, had the QJR Act applied, Dowsett 
J doubted there was very much more that could have been said by way of 
reasons.117 
 
111 Harding v University of New South Wales [2002] NSWSC 113 (1 March 2002) [44]–[46] 
(Wood CJ at CL). The appeal was also dismissed: Harding v University of New South Wales 
[2002] NSWCA 325 (25 September 2002). The subsequent action in the Administrative Deci-
sions Tribunal claiming ‘indirect gender discrimination’ (based on the contention that her prob-
lems arose from a thyroid condition which is more prevalent in women than in men) was also 
dismissed as it was held to be lacking in substance: Harding v Vice-Chancellor, University of 
New South Wales [2003] NSWADT 74 (15 April 2003) [47] (Magistrate Hennessy, Members 
McDonald and Weule). 
112 Harding v University of New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 325 (25 September 2002) [79] (Young 
CJ in Eq). 
113 (1992) 27 ALD 214. 
114 Ibid 220. 
115 Harding v University of New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 325 (25 September 2002) [77] (Young 
CJ in Eq). 
116 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Dowsett J, 3 April 1996). 
117 It is difficult to understand on the face of it why the student commenced legal proceedings in 
these circumstances. 
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2 Student Challenges to Decisions Involving Academic Judgment and 
Assessment 
Many student challenges, while framed in a variety of ways, essentially ques-
tion various aspects of the exercise of academic judgment. Courts may have 
jurisdiction to review administrative decisions but they are reluctant to revisit 
decisions involving academic judgment. Although, as noted above, Woodhouse P 
of the New Zealand Court of Appeal was of the view that universities ‘should be 
subject to public scrutiny in the courts’,118 he was careful to exclude matters of 
purely academic judgment from the Court’s jurisdiction: 
It is easy enough to understand why it has been held that non-justiciable ‘in-
house’ issues ought to be left as a matter of course to the domestic tribunal ei-
ther because they could not sensibly be turned into suitable problems for adju-
dication by the courts or simply as a matter of discretion. The picture conjured 
up by Diplock LJ in Thorne’s case of judges invited to reassess the actual mark-
ing of exam papers may seem a good enough example of that — at least in the 
absence of fraud or malice on the part of the examiner or something of the 
sort.119 
The key decision from the United Kingdom in this area is Clark v University of 
Lincolnshire and Humberside where the Court accepted that students had 
administrative law and contract law rights that are co-existent and not exclusive 
of each other.120 Lord Woolf MR stated that the ‘court … will not involve itself 
with issues that involve making academic judgments’,121 and Sedley LJ, in the 
leading judgment, noted that: 
there are issues of academic or pastoral judgment which the university is 
equipped to consider in breadth and in depth, but on which any judgment of the 
courts would be jejune and inappropriate … [and it] undoubtedly includes, in 
my view, such questions as what mark or class a student ought to be awarded or 
whether an aegrotat is justified.122 
Clark v University of Lincolnshire and Humberside has been considered by 
various Australian courts.123 Kirby J has referred to matters of academic judg-
ment in the following terms: 
universities are in many ways peculiar public institutions. They have special 
responsibilities … to uphold high academic standards about which members of 
the academic staff will often be more cognisant than judges. There are issues 
pertaining to the intimate life of every independent academic institution that, 
sensibly, courts decline to review: the marking of an examination paper; the 
 
118 Norrie v Senate of the University of Auckland [1984] 1 NZLR 129, 134–5. 
119 Ibid. 
120 [2000] 3 All ER 752. 
121 Ibid 759. 
122 Ibid 756. See also R v The Queen; Ex parte Vijayatunga [1990] 2 QB 444; R v Cranfield 
University Senate; Ex parte Bashir [1999] Ed CR 772, where the English courts have clearly 
disclaimed any desire to reconsider matters of academic judgment. 
123 Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99, 157 [165] (Kirby J); Hanna v University of New 
England [2006] NSWSC 122 (5 April 2006) [66] (Malpass AsJ); Walsh v University of Technol-
ogy, Sydney [2007] FCA 880 (15 June 2007) [78] (Buchanan J). 
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academic merit of a thesis; the viability of a research project; the award of aca-
demic tenure; and internal budgets. Others might be added: the contents of a 
course; particular styles of teaching; and the organisation of course timeta-
bles.124 
A leading commentator in the United Kingdom has observed that ‘[t]his judicial 
deference to the sanctity of academic decision-making has long common law 
roots and may be seen as an integral part of the tradition of academic free-
dom.’125 
As outlined in the discussion of the cases below, students will therefore find it 
difficult to legally challenge pure academic decisions, for example, about credit 
for prior study, assessment and academic progress. Unless students can convince 
the court that the challenge is not to the actual decision but to improper proce-
dures in reaching that decision, they will have little success in the courts.126 
(a)   Applications for Credit for Prior Study 
Waldemar Dudzinski had tertiary qualifications from Poland and a Bachelor of 
Applied Science in Geology from the Queensland University of Technology 
when he commenced the Master of Engineering Science in Waste Management 
course at Griffith University. He completed four subjects and, while still enrolled 
in that postgraduate program, also enrolled in a Bachelor of Laws/Bachelor of 
Science and Environmental Sciences combined degree. He sought and was 
denied exemption from certain subjects based on his previous studies, and 
subsequently brought proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia against 
Griffith University and nine members of its academic and administrative staff. 
Dudzinski claimed negligence, defamation, injurious falsehood, conspiracy, 
deceit, assault, racial and sex discrimination, undue influence and breaches of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).127 Drummond J confirmed that, even though the 
University had internal rules and procedures for resolving disputes, the Court had 
jurisdiction to determine the types of matters raised by the student.128 Drum-
mond J also noted that in seeking to terminate the action summarily, the respon-
 
124 Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99, 156–7 [165]. Similarly, Ford and Strope, 
analysing judicial responses to student challenges to academic judgment since the leading United 
States Supreme Court decisions on this issue, concluded that: 
the lower courts in the fifty-nine cases since Horowitz and Ewing deferred to the expertise of 
educators when dealing with academic decisions. In the five instances where the lower courts 
ruled in favour of the students, the institutions appeared to be unfair. The courts will not inter-
fere if, as required in Horowitz, students have notice of the academic rules, and as required in 
Ewing, postsecondary policies, processes, and practices are not substantial departures from 
accepted academic norms. 
  Deborah L Ford and John L Strope Jr, ‘Judicial Responses to Adverse Academic Decisions 
Affecting Public Post-Secondary Institution Students since Horowitz and Ewing’ (1996) 110 
Education Law Reporter 517, 542. 
125 Mark Davies, ‘Challenges to “Academic Immunity” — The Beginning of a New Era?’ (2004) 16 
Education and the Law 75, 76. See also Kaye, above n 43. 
126 On this point, it is significant to note that a matter of academic judgment is specifically excluded 
from being a ‘qualifying complaint’ within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom OIA for 
Higher Education: Higher Education Act 2004 (UK) c 8, s 12(2). 
127 Dudzinski v Kellow (1999) 59 ALD 625. 
128 Ibid 626 [3]. 
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dent University had ‘a heavy burden’. 129  He found this burden was met in 
respect of all the causes of action pleaded by the student, except in relation to the 
claims in negligence against two members of the academic staff and in assault 
against one of the staff members.130 While being careful to state that his decision 
in no way indicated his belief or otherwise in whether the claims were well-
founded, Drummond J declined to strike out the actions in negligence and 
assault.131 His view was that the Queensland District Court was the proper court 
in which these claims should be determined.132 As he had no power to transfer 
the claims to the District Court, Drummond J permanently stayed the further 
prosecution of the claims in the Federal Court.133  
Fayez Phillipe Hanna, a law student at the University of New England, applied 
for advanced standing for certain subjects based on courses he had taken at other 
universities, his membership of journalist and writers’ associations, and the fact 
that he had conducted his own defamation case.134 When his application was 
rejected, he sought relief in the Supreme Court of New South Wales on the 
grounds of judicial review, discrimination, defamation, and breach of provisions 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).135 The proceedings were dismissed as 
there had been a ‘failure to demonstrate error in relation to any of the decisions 
(let alone error of law).’136 Malpass AsJ also drew attention to the fact that the 
decisions challenged ‘involved academic assessment’,137 and that the student had 
 
129 Ibid 626 [2], citing General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 
CLR 125, 129–30 (Barwick CJ). 
130 Dudzinski v Kellow (1999) 59 ALD 625, 641 [93]. The negligence claim was for economic loss 
resulting from the negligently made decision of the academic who allegedly did not have suffi-
cient expertise to enable him to make a proper comparison of the relevant subjects when he 
applied the university’s exemption policy. The assault claim arose out of a conversation with a 
staff member who lost his temper and ordered the applicant out of his office. 
131 Ibid 638 [72]–[73]. 
132 Ibid 642 [96]. 
133 Ibid 642 [97]. The application for leave to appeal the decision of Drummond J was dismissed: 
Dudzinski v Kellow [1999] FCA 1264 (27 August 1999). The motion to stay the orders of the Full 
Court pending leave to the High Court was refused: Dudzinski v Kellow [1999] FCA 1665 (23 
November 1999). It is not clear whether the student pursued the matter in the District Court; 
however, he did pursue the matter again in the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commis-
sion, which decided that it had jurisdiction to hear the complaint as Griffith University was a 
‘trading corporation’ trading in educational services: Dudzinski v Griffith University [2000] 
HREOCA 7 (23 February 2000). The complaint was dismissed as ‘there [was] not the slightest 
basis for a conclusion that the complainant was refused credit because of his sex’: Dudzinski v 
Griffith University [No 2] [2000] HREOCA 22 (3 June 2000) (Inquiry Commissioner Carter). 
The saga continued when Dudzinski was involved in further litigation with the University fol-
lowing the issue of a bankruptcy notice against him claiming $17 700, being the costs of his 
failed Federal Court proceedings: Dudzinski v Kellow [2002] FCA 266 (15 March 2002). 
134 The defamation case was struck out as an abuse of process of the court: Hanna v Maks [2003] 
NSWSC 158 (19 March 2003) [41]–[42] (Levine J). Malpass AsJ was of the view that ‘[i]t 
would be indisputable that such a matter would not be regarded as evidence of prior learning of 
law. Indeed, it might be thought to be powerful evidence of lack of learning’: Hanna v University 
of New England [2006] NSWSC 122 (5 April 2006) [69]. 
135 Hanna v University of New England [2006] NSWSC 122 (5 April 2006). 
136 Ibid [70] (Malpass AsJ). The notice of appeal was declined by the Court registry as the student 
had not sought leave to appeal. His application to review the Registrar’s decision was dismissed: 
Hanna v Registrar of the Court of Appeal of NSW [2006] NSWSC 564 (8 May 2006). 
137 Hanna v University of New England [2006] NSWSC 122 (5 April 2006) [66]. 
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chosen not to pursue a remedy through the University’s internal procedures 
before embarking upon his claims before the Court, which ‘should have been 
seen as a last resort’.138  
(b)   Applications Regarding Course Content and Assessment Standards 
It has been noted that it is for a university 
to establish the course of study in which … [students] enrolled and set the re-
quirements to be satisfied, including the academic standard to be achieved as 
demonstrated by assignments or other coursework. Decisions about such mat-
ters are inherently unsuited to judicial review.139 
It was therefore not surprising that when Dr Gorman sought orders from the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales that the four defendant universities instruct 
various faculties of their respective universities ‘to cogitate and teach, either as 
dogma or as controversy, the principles and practice of health care which have 
been potentially exposed by the discovery that vision improves, in appropriate 
patients, when the spine is manipulated’,140 the action was dismissed as ‘frivo-
lous and vexatious and an abuse.’141 James J was unable to find any reasonable 
cause of action or any legal basis to require others to ‘espouse a particular 
teaching and to disseminate that treatment’.142 
Christine Joy Ivins, a first-year nursing student, made a written complaint to 
the Dean of the Faculty of Nursing at Griffith University about the conduct of 
one of her lecturers (concerning interactions in lectures and the assessment of her 
individual essay) and about the use of group assessment in two subjects.143 A 
meeting with relevant staff and a mediation conference organised through the 
Department of Justice left her dissatisfied, as the assessment for the courses 
remained unchanged and the lecturer was not reprimanded for her conduct.144 
Ivins also complained about the decision to fail her in two subjects.145  Her 
individual assessments were re-marked but the fail grades did not change. She 
unsuccessfully appealed pursuant to the University’s policy on student griev-
ances and appeals and then sought judicial review in the Supreme Court of 
Queensland.146 As discussed above,147 her action failed on jurisdictional grounds. 
 
138 Ibid [71]. 
139 Walsh v University of Technology, Sydney [2007] FCA 880 (15 June 2007) [74] (Buchanan J) 
(emphasis added). 
140 Gorman v University of Sydney [1999] NSWSC 240 (15 March 1999) [1] (James J). 
141 Ibid [9]. 
142 Ibid [8]. 
143 Ivins v Griffith University [2001] QSC 86 (29 March 2001) [7] (Phillippides J). 
144 Ibid [16]–[18]. 
145 Ibid [17]. Ivins passed the group work assessment and the use of group work assessment was not 
the reason for the ‘fail’ grades awarded. There was no evidence to support the allegation that she 
failed these subjects for making the complaint about the group assessment: Ivins v Griffith Uni-
versity [2001] QCA 393 (19 September 2001) (Williams JA). 
146 None of the decisions was ‘a decision made under an enactment’ as required by the QJR Act: 
Ivins v Griffith University [2001] QSC 86 (29 March 2001) [22] (Phillippides J). 
147 Part IV(A). 
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Nonetheless, the Court noted that Ivins had no legal right to be present when her 
work was re-marked as 
the rules of natural justice were adequately met by the procedure set out in the 
University’s policy and did not require that in addition to the written submis-
sions of the applicant, the applicant should have been afforded an opportunity 
to be present and to have been heard orally.148 
Peter Walsh, a postgraduate student at the University of Technology, Sydney 
(‘UTS’) also had a number of complaints about various assessments in his course 
and subsequently commenced legal proceedings in the Federal Court of Austra-
lia.149 Although he agreed he was asking the Court ‘to strike out into new legal 
territory’, 150  he was unable to draw the Court’s attention to any statutory 
provision, authority or legal principle which might provide a starting point for 
this type of case.151 Essentially, Walsh was dissatisfied with the evaluation of two 
assignments by two lecturers in the course and their disapproval of the major 
project he pursued as a third assignment. He was given the opportunity to re-
submit the third assignment but did not do so; instead he sought internal review 
within the University before seeking relief in the courts. Buchanan J noted that 
‘[t]he Court is being asked not only to vindicate … [the student’s] choice of topic 
for his individual project but to substitute a different assessment of his work and 
directly enforce a passing grade’.152 The Court found that ‘judgment[s] to be 
made by UTS with respect to requirements for the award of a degree are not 
matters susceptible to judicial review in the ordinary way.’153 
(c)   Applications Concerning Academic Progress 
Failure to meet course requirements has adverse consequences for students, 
who may be excluded from their universities and unable to complete their chosen 
degrees. There may also be adverse consequences beyond the university. 
Commonwealth supported students may, for example, find their ‘Student 
Learning Entitlement’ reduced,154  and international students may find their 
student visas cancelled.155 It is therefore imperative that universities act fairly in 
relation to the exclusion of students from coursework and research. 
 
148 Ibid [42]. In Ivins v Griffith University [2001] QCA 393 (19 September 2001), Williams JA noted 
that: 
Clearly when it is purely a question of academic assessment or academic judgement the stu-
dent has no right to be present on the marking of examination papers. It may well be different 
if the evaluation of the student’s progress or the question of exclusion of a student from the 
university involves questions other than mere academic judgment. 
149 Walsh v University of Technology, Sydney [2007] FCA 880 (15 June 2007). 
150 Ibid [71] (Buchanan J). 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid [57]. 
153 Ibid [86]. His application for an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal was refused: 
Walsh v University of Technology, Sydney [2007] FCA 1308 (2 August 2007). 
154 See, eg, Re Kanesbi and Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace 
Relations [2008] AATA 277 (8 April 2008). 
155 See, eg, Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] 
FMCA 576 (20 April 2005). 
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While the courts have demonstrated a reluctance to interfere in academic 
decisions, they will take care to determine whether the challenge is to a decision 
that involved academic judgment or to the process by which an academic 
decision was made. Substance is immune from review but process is not. This is 
clearly shown in R (Persaud) v University of Cambridge,156 the leading UK case, 
which involved a PhD student who had a series of disagreements with successive 
supervisors and who had made little progress in her research. Her application for 
judicial review of the decision to discontinue her candidature was dismissed at 
first instance,157 but her appeal was allowed in part.158 The Court of Appeal 
stressed that the Board of Graduate Studies, in exercising its power under the 
University regulations to discontinue her PhD candidature, was under a duty to 
act fairly.159 The Board’s rejection of her account of events, without first putting 
their doubts about its accuracy to her, was in breach of that duty, as was the 
failure to make available to her various reports including those of an independent 
academic that appeared to raise a new issue about the potential value of her 
research.160 Chadwick LJ, delivering the judgment of the Court, said: 
there is no principle of fairness which requires, as a general rule, that a person 
should be entitled to challenge, or make representations with a view to chang-
ing, a purely academic judgment on his or her work or potential. But each case 
must be examined on its own facts. On a true analysis, this case is not, as it 
seems to me, a challenge to academic judgment; it is a challenge to the process 
by which it was determined that she should not be reinstated to the Register of 
Graduate Students because the course of research for which she had been ad-
mitted had ceased to be viable. I am satisfied that that process failed to measure 
up to the standard of fairness required of the University.161 
Dean Jenkins was excluded from an Associate Degree of Policing at Charles 
Sturt University when he failed a key subject twice. When his appeals within the 
University failed, he commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales claiming denial of natural justice and error of law.162 The practice of 
the Faculty Appeals Committee was to decide appeals on the papers but, 
following his written submissions, Jenkins was granted an interview with the 
presence of a support person. The University’s Academic Appeals Committee 
also dealt with appeals on the papers and Jenkins made written submissions 
 
156 [2001] EWCA Civ 534 (10 April 2001). 
157 R (Persaud) v University of Cambridge [2000] EWHC Admin 374 (21 July 2000). 
158 R (Persaud) v University of Cambridge [2001] EWCA Civ 534 (10 April 2001). The Court 
allowed the appeal insofar as it quashed the decision of the Board of Graduate Studies to remove 
her name from the Register of Graduate Students, but as she was now engaged in substantially 
different research (she had started work on a new research project with a new supervisor) the 
Court was of the view that an order of mandamus would be inappropriate and would serve no 
useful purpose: at [44] (Chadwick LJ). 
159 Ibid [33]. 
160 Ibid [40]. 
161 Ibid [41]. 
162 Jenkins v Charles Sturt University [2008] NSWSC 50 (13 February 2008). 
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which had been drafted by his legal counsel. The proceedings were dismissed as 
there was no evidence of a denial of natural justice.163  
3 Student Challenges to Decisions about Misconduct  
(a)   Academic Misconduct 
As with adverse decisions about academic progress, decisions involving aca-
demic misconduct can also have consequences beyond the university. A series of 
recent cases highlights the importance of full disclosure by those seeking 
admission to legal practice of allegations or findings of academic misconduct 
and plagiarism in relation to university assessments.164 
Courts in Australia and elsewhere have drawn a clear distinction between 
matters of academic judgment (which courts will generally not review) and 
matters of academic misconduct (which courts will generally review):165 
as Maurice Kay J explained in R v University of Cambridge; Ex parte Persaud 
… it is entirely ‘correct’ of courts ‘to distinguish between the disciplinary type 
of case and the situation where what is in issue is pure academic judgment’ … 
Academic judgment is one thing. But where an individual who has the requisite 
interest is affected by disciplinary decisions of an administrative nature made 
by a university body acting according to its powers under a statute, outside the 
few categories peculiar to ‘pure academic judgment’, such decisions are suscep-
tible to judicial review. They are so elsewhere. They should likewise be so in 
Australia. An appeal to ‘academic judgment’ does not smother the duties of a 
university, like any other statutory body, to exhibit, in such cases, the basic re-
quirements of procedural fairness implicit in their creation by public statute and 
receipt of public funds from the pockets of the people.166 
 
163 The Court also commented on the utility of granting any relief in the circumstances, as the two-
year exclusion period expired at the end of 2008: ibid [25] (Malpass AsJ). 
164 Law Society of Tasmania v Richardson [2003] TASSC 9 (18 March 2003); Re AJG [2004] QCA 
88 (15 March 2004); Re Liveri [2006] QCA 152 (12 May 2006); Re OG [2007] VSC 197 (8 June 
2007); Re OG (2007) 18 VR 164. In one case, disclosure was made of academic misconduct, but 
the Court was prepared to revisit the allegations of plagiarism and unauthorised collaboration and 
make findings in favour of the student applicant: Re Humzy-Hancock [2007] QSC 34 (26 Febru-
ary 2007). For a detailed discussion of this and other related cases, see J Joy Cumming, ‘Where 
Courts and Academe Converge: Findings of Fact or Academic Judgment’ (2007) 12(1) Australia 
& New Zealand Journal of Law & Education 97; Mary Wyburn, ‘Disclosure of Prior Student 
Academic Misconduct in Admission to Legal Practice: Lessons for Universities and the Courts’ 
(2008) 8 Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 314; Lillian Corbin and 
Justin Carter, ‘Is Plagiarism Indicative of Prospective Legal Practice?’ (2007) 17 Legal Educa-
tion Review 53; Ralph D Mawdsley and J Joy Cumming, ‘Plagiarism Litigation Trends in the 
USA and Australia’ (2008) 20 Education and the Law 209. 
165 Cf Whitehead v Griffith University [2003] 1 Qd R 220 (a decision made under a contract of 
employment was not subject to judicial review); Bird v Campbelltown Anglican Schools Council 
[2007] NSWSC 1419 (the principles of natural justice were not implied in a contract with a 
private college). It has been held that plagiarism is a valid reason for termination of the employ-
ment of a member of general staff and, as the applicant had ‘received a fair go all around’, the 
termination of employment was not harsh, unjust or oppressive: Quinn and Charles Sturt Univer-
sity [2006] AIRC 96 (15 February 2006) [85] (Commissioner Roberts). For an interesting exam-
ple of the type of legal action that may follow allegations of academic misconduct by an honours 
student, see Rexha v Curtin University of Technology [2002] WASC 152 (14 June 2002), where 
the supervisor considered bringing defamation proceedings against the university when it circu-
lated minutes of a meeting at which his allegations were discussed. 
166 Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99, 157 [166] (Kirby J). 
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Because of the way matters had proceeded in Griffith University v Tang, no 
court had had the opportunity to examine the substance of Vivian Tang’s 
complaint about the decision to exclude her from her PhD candidature for 
academic misconduct. In essence, her complaints were: that the Chair of the 
University’s Assessment Board was not impartial as he was the person who had 
initially investigated the complaint against her; that she had been denied legal 
representation and adequate time to evaluate and respond to expert witnesses 
relied on by the University; that the University had breached its own policy; and 
that the decisions were not based on relevant material and evidence.167 Tang may 
or may not have been able to substantiate any of these complaints, but the High 
Court ended any opportunity of her doing so by holding that the QJR Act did not 
apply in the circumstances.168 Aronson has commented that ‘there was undoubt-
edly a real dispute between the parties as to whether the University had adhered 
to its misconduct code. That would probably have been a sufficient basis for an 
application to a State Supreme Court for declaratory relief’.169 Unfortunately, the 
question of whether Tang would be entitled to relief under the common law, 
pursuant to the powers of the Supreme Court of Queensland, or otherwise, did 
not arise because she had relied solely on the statutory procedures and sought 
only the statutory remedies provided by the QJR Act. 
There have been cases, however, where the courts have had the opportunity to 
consider student complaints about decisions involving academic misconduct. In 
these cases the courts have consistently and universally insisted on strict adher-
ence to accepted administrative law principles, for example, regarding the proper 
constitution of decision-making committees and the absence of bias, the need to 
follow proper procedure and comply with natural justice, and the need to reach 
decisions that take into account all relevant matters, and that are not contrary to 
law.170 
A recent case illustrates the requirements of procedural fairness in these cir-
cumstances. Sherrie Tadros was undertaking a Bachelor of Pharmacy at Charles 
Sturt University that she had anticipated completing by the end of 2008. In 2007, 
she enrolled in the pharmacy practice subject which required her to complete 
practical work experience. However, in October that year, she advised one of her 
professors that she had not done the placement and admitted that the documents 
she submitted as evidence of completion of this work were false. The matter was 
referred to the Head of School who conducted an inquiry and recommended that 
the Acting Dean recommend to the Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Academic) that 
 
167 Ibid 138–9 [115]–[116]. 
168 Ibid. In the dissenting view of Kirby J, this result was ‘surprising’, at 139 [118]: 
Given her enrolment in the University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, the nature of the 
complaints that the respondent wished to ventilate, the public character of the University as a 
statutory authority substantially supported by public funds, the devastating consequences of 
the University ‘decision’ on the immediate and long-term career and reputation of the respon-
dent and the language and purpose of the Review Act. 
169 Aronson, above n 99, 23. 
170 For a recent study of the student disciplinary rules at a sample of Australian universities, see 
Bruce Lindsay, ‘University Hearings: Student Discipline Rules and Fair Procedures’ (2008) 15 
Australian Journal of Administrative Law 146. 
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Tadros be failed in the subject and be excluded from the University for two 
years.171  The Acting Dean made the recommendation and the Deputy Vice-
Chancellor (Academic) then wrote to Tadros in November 2007 stating that she 
had been found guilty of academic misconduct and consequently failed in the 
pharmacy practice subject and excluded from the University for two years, and, 
should she wish to resume her studies after the period of exclusion, she would 
have to apply for admission as if she were a new applicant. Tadros lodged an 
appeal against the severity of the penalty imposed under the University’s policy 
on student academic misconduct, but she was initially advised that her appeal 
would not be heard because the policy only allowed appeals on procedural 
grounds. She then commenced legal proceedings, but before the matter was 
heard by the Court, the University arranged for her appeal to be heard by the 
Academic Misconduct Appeals Committee, which upheld the penalty, deciding it 
was lenient rather than severe.172  
There was no issue before the Court as to its jurisdiction to intervene or as to 
Tadros’ guilt of serious academic misconduct. The key issues before the Court 
were the correct construction of the academic misconduct policy and the 
requirements of procedural fairness. The Court commented that: ‘It would be of 
advantage to amend the Policy to make the procedure clearer where the aca-
demic misconduct has been admitted’ as they were ‘less than explicit and apt’173 
and ‘[c]ommon fairness required that the University take into account that the 
student admitted the misconduct alleged.’174 The Court noted that after Tadros’ 
conversation with her professor, she was not notified of any investigation or 
deliberation by the University and was not advised of the recommendations as to 
penalty made by the Head of School and the Dean.175 In the circumstances, this 
was held to be a denial of procedural fairness because a penalty had been 
imposed without giving the applicant the opportunity to make submissions, and 
so the University decisions were declared void.176 
Having the University’s decision declared void by a court does not prevent the 
University dealing further with the matter. If the University did revisit the 
decision, it would have to give Tadros the opportunity to make submissions as to 
penalty, but, in considering the matter afresh, it would be for the University to 
decide whether the same penalty or a lesser penalty should be imposed.177  
It is therefore clear that university rules and processes on student misconduct 
need to be carefully drafted to ensure procedural fairness in all situations, as the 
courts will insist on this and can declare decisions made pursuant to unfair 
processes void. The cases clearly illustrate that if decisions about academic 
 
171 Tadros v Charles Sturt University [2008] NSWSC 1140 (30 October 2008) [4] (Smart AJ). 
172 Ibid [17]. 
173 Ibid [78]. 
174 Ibid [80]. 
175 Ibid [84]. 
176 Ibid [154]. 
177 Ibid [153]. 
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misconduct are made in accordance with general administrative law principles 
and fairness, then students will find little comfort in the courts.  
In Lam v The University of Sydney,178 a student enrolled in the second aca-
demic year in the Faculty of Medicine came before a Student Proctorial Board on 
charges of misconduct under the University by-laws. It was alleged that he 
offered a sum of money to an administrative assistant employed by the Univer-
sity for information regarding the contents of the histology examination paper he 
was due to sit. The Board found the charges had been established and ordered 
that Lam be expelled from the University. However, it also recommended that he 
should be permitted to apply for readmission after four years, provided he 
satisfied the University that since his expulsion he had been a person of good 
character and was fit and proper to be readmitted. 
Lam was legally represented before the Board and also before the Appeals 
Committee of the Senate, which dismissed his appeal from the Board’s decision. 
Lam then made an application to the Vice-Chancellor seeking his recommenda-
tion to the University Senate that the adverse finding against him be quashed on 
the basis of fresh alibi evidence. The Vice-Chancellor declined to make this 
recommendation and it was this decision that Lam challenged in the courts on 
the basis of denial of natural justice. Gleeson CJ noted that by the time the matter 
had come to the Vice-Chancellor, there had already been a full hearing involving 
oral evidence and argument before the Board and a full appeal conducted on the 
basis of written submissions before the Appeals Committee.179 There was no 
adequate explanation as to why the alibi evidence had not been presented at 
those times. Essentially, the Vice-Chancellor was being asked to exercise a 
discretion in favour of the student. The New South Wales Court of Appeal held 
that given the background of the matter, the nature of the function he was 
exercising and the grounds on which he was being asked to intervene, it had not 
been shown that the Vice-Chancellor had departed from the requirements of 
procedural fairness, and so the appeal was dismissed.180 
Simjanoski v La Trobe University181 arose because coordinators in a maths and 
an engineering subject alleged that several students had access to the solutions 
papers for the exams. This allegation was based on the students’ examination 
answers and their past performances in the subjects and was supported by the 
fact that the students had reproduced the errors from the solutions paper. The 
chief examiner wrote to each of the students and invited them to respond to an 
allegation of academic misconduct. The students provided written responses and 
the matter was referred to the Academic Misconduct Committee of the Faculty of 
Science, Technology and Engineering as required by the University regulations 
on student discipline and misconduct. That Committee found that the students 
had committed an act of academic misconduct and each was given a zero grade 
for each subject and excluded from the University for a period of time. When the 
 
178 [1997] NSWSCA 184 (22 April 1997). 
179 Ibid [11]. 
180 Ibid [14] (Gleeson CJ). 
181 [2004] VSC 180 (27 May 2004). 
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students’ internal appeal was heard and dismissed by the Reserve Proctorial 
Board, the students commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria 
seeking judicial review of the decisions of the Committee and the Board. 
Balmford J concentrated on whether the students’ claims of lack of procedural 
fairness had been proven on the facts.182 Counsel for the student plaintiffs first 
argued that the Board’s role was purely judicial and that it was improper for it to 
take on an inquisitorial role and treat the chief examiners as mere witnesses 
instead of prosecutors.183 Secondly, it was argued that the presence on the Board 
of an expert in mathematics was inappropriate. 184  Thirdly, the decision was 
challenged on the ground of apprehended bias as a member of the Board and a 
person who was giving evidence obtained coffee together and engaged in 
conversation during a break in the hearing.185 The Supreme Court found against 
the students on all these arguments. Her Honour noted that, according to the 
relevant University regulations, the Board could follow any procedure it consid-
ered appropriate, and found that it had acted fairly to all parties in the manner in 
which it had dealt with the claims, that its fairness was not compromised by the 
presence of an expert on the disciplinary tribunal, and that no imputation of bias 
could be drawn in the circumstances by the ‘fair minded lay observer’. 186 
Accordingly, the students’ application for review was dismissed. Leave to appeal 
was refused by the Court of Appeal.187 
(b)   Non-Academic Misconduct 
When the courts have considered student complaints about decisions involving 
non-academic misconduct, again they have consistently and universally insisted 
on strict adherence to accepted administrative law principles, and they have 
made it clear that students have a right to a fair hearing. A court satisfied of this 
will not interfere with the decision. 
When Katherine Bray and 57 other students at The University of Melbourne 
unlawfully entered and occupied one of the University’s administration build-
ings, they were charged with breaches of discipline and good order under the 
University’s student discipline statute. A hearing was conducted pursuant to the 
student discipline statute and Bray was suspended from her Bachelor of Arts 
course for one semester. Her appeal to the University’s Appeal Committee was 
dismissed, so Bray subsequently commenced legal proceedings in the Supreme 
Court of Victoria seeking judicial review of the University decisions.188 
Byrne J found there was no substance to Bray’s argument that the rules of 
natural justice had been breached at the University hearings because, in its 
handling of her appeal, the Appeal Committee had acted fairly and had given her 
 
182 Ibid [45]. 
183 Ibid [21]. 
184 Ibid [25]. 
185 Ibid [31]–[32]. 
186 Ibid [22], [30], [39]. 
187 Simjanoski v La Trobe University [2004] VSCA 125 (23 July 2004). 
188 Bray v The University of Melbourne [2001] VSC 391 (19 October 2001). 
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the opportunity to know the case she had to meet and to respond to it.189 How-
ever, his Honour did set aside the decision of the Appeal Committee and ordered 
the matter be remitted to it for further consideration190 on the ground that it had 
acted ultra vires: although the Committee had the power to exclude a student 
from the University, it did not have authority to suspend her from her course. 
Counsel for the University argued the Committee’s use of the word ‘suspended’ 
in the penalty ‘was an infelicity’191 and that it was ‘an issue of semantics rather 
than one of substance.’ 192  After reviewing the University rules, his Honour 
disagreed: the suspension of a student’s enrolment in a course was not a punitive 
course open to the Committee.193 His Honour also rejected Counsel’s argument 
to decline relief as a matter of discretion on the basis that the penalty imposed 
was less severe than that which would in all probability be imposed if the matter 
were remitted to the Appeal Committee as he was not prepared to assume the 
Committee would impose a more severe penalty on her.194  
At around the same time as Katherine Bray’s legal action, Loc Tien Hoang, a 
Monash University student, was also involved in judicial review proceedings in 
the Supreme Court of Victoria.195 In March 2000, Hoang had been found guilty 
of general misconduct by the discipline committee of the Faculty of Business 
and Economics and was excluded from the University from that date to the end 
of the 2001 academic year.196 Allegations were made against Hoang that, despite 
a number of attempts that had been made to get him to desist from contacting a 
female staff member, he had not done so. Hoang admitted this conduct but 
argued it did not amount to harassment or intimidation. He also argued that the 
penalty was too severe and should be compared to a ‘much lesser penalty 
imposed upon students at The University of Melbourne who had caused property 
damage in a rampage earlier this year.’197 
Although Hoang had a right of appeal under the provisions of the University 
statute, he did not avail himself of that right. Instead, he commenced legal 
proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria in which he appeared in person. It 
is not surprising that the Court had some difficulty understanding the precise 
nature of the proceedings and took care to explain its conclusions, particularly as 
at all times Hoang was unrepresented by legal counsel. Ashley J wanted to  
make it clear to the plaintiff … that the proceeding before me is not a proceed-
ing which enables a re-hearing of the matter which was heard by the discipline 
committee. No such appeal is possible to this court or to any other court. … 
This court is solely concerned with whether or not there was some procedural 
unfairness in the proceeding below, or whether the decision that was reached 
 
189 Ibid [23]. 
190 Ibid [26]. 
191 Ibid [8]. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid [12]. 
194 Ibid [14]. 
195 Hoang v Monash University [2001] VSC 376 (4 October 2001). 
196 Ibid [1] (Ashley J). 
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was so far out of kilter with the material before the committee that it was shown 
to be quite unreasonable.198 
After reviewing the procedure deposed to in the affidavits proffered by the 
University, the Court held ‘that the plaintiff was afforded no less than procedural 
propriety.’199 The Court also noted that it was open to the discipline committee to 
make a finding of harassment given that the staff member had obtained an 
intervention order from the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria which prohibited 
Hoang from contacting her or being within 400 metres of the University’s 
Caulfield campus.200 Furthermore, the Court confirmed that the reasonableness 
of a penalty in one case could not be measured by comparing penalties in a 
dissimilar case and held that the discipline committee was entitled to form the 
view that the student had persisted in making unwarranted advances to the staff 
member and that this had been distressing to her and merited a significant 
penalty.201 
When Taragh Wilde, a postgraduate student at The University of Sydney, was 
charged with misconduct under the University by-laws, she also challenged the 
University’s actions in the courts.202 She had earlier complained of harassment 
by members of the security staff, but an internal inquiry by the University found 
her allegations to be unsubstantiated. The matter had come to the attention of the 
Vice-Chancellor, who determined that misconduct proceedings should be 
commenced against Wilde because she failed to respond to reasonable and lawful 
requests to identify herself and she had physically assaulted patrol officers by 
kicking and spitting on them.203 The essence of Wilde’s complaint was that the 
University allowed her allegations of harassment to be turned against her and be 
used to commence student misconduct proceedings.204  The Court refused to 
accept Wilde’s claim that she had been denied natural justice, because she was 
not informed of the possibility that the inquiry following her complaint might 
lead to allegations of student misconduct. In the view of Macready AJ: 
I cannot see how in any way the University, in deciding whether or not to put in 
train such a process, is first obliged to give notice of the fact that it is consider-
ing doing so to the plaintiff. … The withdrawal by the plaintiff of her allega-
tions of harassment would have done nothing as the University was properly 
and lawfully in possession of her allegations, reports from its patrol officers and 
the results of the investigation, which they quite properly put in hand when the 
allegations were made. … In the proper performance of its functions faced with 
such allegations it had to take some steps to investigate the claims. In my view 
there is no substance in this point.205 
 
198 Ibid [9]. 
199 Ibid [14]. 
200 Ibid [4], [10]. 
201 Ibid [13]. 
202 Wilde v University of Sydney [2002] NSWSC 954 (15 October 2002). 
203 Ibid [10] (Macready AJ). 
204 Ibid [27]. 
205 Ibid [38]. The student’s subsequent complaint of transgender discrimination was also ultimately 
dismissed: Wilde v University of Sydney (EOD) [2004] NSWADTAP 32 (27 July 2004). 
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C  Allegations of Discrimination 
Some dissatisfied students have not alleged the university’s failure to observe 
principles of natural justice as discussed above, but have alleged discrimination 
by the university. This alternative legal course has also generally been unsuccess-
ful for the students involved. 
A recent survey of litigation involving Australian universities found that 
‘[c]omplaints of discrimination make up almost half of the total number of 
student cases, but few of these cases are actually about conduct prohibited by 
discrimination legislation’. 206  In most cases, students have attempted to use 
discrimination legislation to remedy their dissatisfaction with an adverse 
university decision by alleging some form of discrimination on the part of the 
university in relation to enrolment, assessment, academic progress or disciplinary 
proceedings. This strategy has generally failed as students have been unable to 
substantiate their claims or prove that they were treated differently based on a 
reason proscribed by legislation.207 
Prospective students have been unable to establish a causal link between the 
rejection of their applications and the alleged discriminatory actions by the 
universities.208 This has especially been the case where applications for enrol-
ment in postgraduate courses have been rejected because of insufficient profes-
sional experience or level of prior study,209 or failure to meet the university’s 
entry criteria.210 Jennifer Jandruwanda alleged racial discrimination when she 
attempted to enrol in a postgraduate course at the University of South Australia, 
and, although there was evidence of unfair and inappropriate treatment, ulti-
mately the Court found that, without more, this did not amount to discrimination 
simply because she was an Aboriginal person.211 
Current students have challenged decisions involving academic assessment, 
alleging discrimination based on political beliefs,212  ‘presumed’ homosexual-
ity,213 and race.214 Students have also challenged decisions to exclude them from 
 
206 Astor, ‘Australian Universities in Court’, above n 2, 167. 
207 Commonwealth and state laws operate concurrently in this area. See Australian Human Rights 
Commission Act 1986 (Cth); Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth); Disability Discrimination Act 
1992 (Cth); Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth); Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). See also 
Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT); Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld); Equal Opportunity Act 
1984 (SA); Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas); Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic); Equal Op-
portunity Act 1984 (WA). A university is an ‘educational authority’ as defined in Disability Dis-
crimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 4; Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) s 4. Specific provision is 
made regarding discrimination in education in Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 22; Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 21; Anti-Discrimination Act 1997 (NSW) ss 17 and 31A. 
208 See, eg, Fainstein v University of New South Wales [2004] NSWADT 26 (10 February 2004). 
209 See, eg, Abdulla v The University of Sydney [No 1] [1997] NSWEOT 130 (18 April 1997). 
210 See, eg, Rana v The Flinders University of South Australia [2005] FMCA 1473 (24 November 
2005). 
211 See Jandruwanda v University of South Australia [2004] FCA 219 (15 March 2004). 
212 See, eg, Loizou v University of Melbourne [2000] VSC 1 (28 January 2000). 
213 Z v University of A [2001] NSWADT 110 (18 June 2001). 
214 See, eg, Simundic v University of Newcastle [2007] FCAFC 144 (31 August 2007); Tu v 
University of Sydney [No 2] (EOD) [2002] NSWADTAP 25 (13 August 2002). 
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their courses, alleging discrimination based on race215 and disability216 and have 
alleged discrimination when adverse decisions have been made in relation to 
plagiarism217 and non-academic misconduct.218 All these legal challenges have 
failed. Had these students framed their legal action based on administrative law 
principles, it is unlikely the outcome would have been any different from 
students challenging decisions involving academic judgment or decisions made 
pursuant to proper procedures. 
D  FOI Applications  
The only area where students have had some success is with challenges to 
university decisions relating to what information will and will not be released to 
them. 
Although it has been argued that the existence of FOI legislation ‘has had a 
major and positive impact on changing the culture of the public sector from 
being very inward looking to accepting a greater sense of openness’,219 this 
epiphany may have taken longer to reach universities. 
Rights under FOI legislation are limited only by ‘exceptions and exemptions 
necessary for the protection of essential public interests and the private and 
business affairs of persons in respect of whom information is collected and held 
by … public authorities’.220 Each of the FOI Acts contains exemption provisions 
which can only be relied upon to deny access to specific documents.221 
1 Documents That Do Not Exist or Cannot Be Found 
Requests for access to documents may be refused if the documents do not exist 
or cannot be found.222 Tony Redfern’s application for access to the marking 
guidelines for a law exam failed as the evidence was that written marking criteria 
did not and never existed.223 The AAT confirmed that the right of access con-
 
215 See, eg, Bahonko v Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology [2006] FCA 1492 (24 November 
2006); Chung v University of Sydney [2002] FCA 186 (21 February 2002); Elmaraazey v Univer-
sity of New South Wales [1996] HREOCA 17 (17 July 1996); Huang v University of New South 
Wales [2008] FCA 1930 (18 December 2008); Sekhon v Ballarat University College [1993] 
HREOCA 17 (30 July 1993); Yonis v Vice-Chancellor, University of New South Wales [2005] 
NSWADT 109 (17 May 2005). 
216 See, eg, Huang v University of New South Wales [2008] FCA 1930 (18 December 2008); Yonis v 
Vice-Chancellor, University of New South Wales [2005] NSWADT 109 (17 May 2005). 
217 See, eg, Kunhi v University of New England [2008] NSWADT 333 (16 December 2008). 
218 See, eg, Wecker v University of Technology, Sydney [2007] NSWSC 927 (23 August 2007). 
219 Ron McLeod, ‘Freedom of Information — An Ombudsman’s Perspective’ (2001) 29 Federal 
Law Review 359, 363. See also Rick Snell, ‘Freedom of Information: The Experience of the 
Australian States — An Epiphany?’ (2001) 29 Federal Law Review 343. 
220 See, eg, Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) s 3(1)(b). 
221 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) pt IV; Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) pt 4; 
Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW) sch 1; Information Act (NT) pt 4; Right to Information 
Act 2009 (Qld) sch 3; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) sch 1; Freedom of Information Act 
1991 (Tas) pt 3; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) pt IV; Freedom of Information Act 1992 
(WA) sch 1. 
222 See, eg, Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) s 24A; Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA) 
s 26. 
223 Re Redfern and University of Canberra (1995) 38 ALD 457, 461 [15] (Deputy President 
McMahon). 
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ferred by the legislation224 is a right to obtain access to documents, not informa-
tion, and that there was no obligation on the University to collect information in 
its possession and then to create a new document so it could be provided when 
requested.225 
When requested documents exist or should exist, inquiry is made as to the 
adequacy of the searches conducted to locate the documents. If all reasonable 
steps have been taken to find the documents and yet they still cannot be found, 
access may be rightly refused.226 This does not augur well for the administrative 
processes or record-keeping practices of an agency such as a university, particu-
larly when the requested documents relate to Board of Examiners and Academic 
Appeals Committee decisions to exclude a student from doctoral studies.227 
However, 
[t]he question is simply whether the FOI request now under consideration was 
the subject of an adequate search and response. An agency is not bound by 
FOIA to keep documents in anticipation of a possible request or dispute. FOIA 
simply deals with the record system as it exists at the time a request is made.228 
Accordingly, Robert Anderson’s 2003 application seeking access to all relevant 
documents concerning a dispute he had with Charles Sturt University over the 
grade he was awarded in a subject in 1996 failed insofar as he wanted access to 
the exam answer booklet he submitted. The exam booklet had been marked and 
kept for four months after which it was destroyed in accordance with University 
policy.229  
The second element of Anderson’s claim was that the mark awarded to him for 
the relevant subject was incorrect. The Administrative Decisions Tribunal 
considered that although it was not permissible for a student disappointed by a 
mark to challenge the academic judgment involved in the assessment of aca-
demic work via FOI legislation, it was permissible for the student to examine the 
records to see if there were any errors.230 In the Tribunal’s view it was ‘a matter 
 
224 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) s 11. 
225 Re Redfern and University of Canberra (1995) 38 ALD 457, 461 [17]–[19] (Deputy President 
McMahon). 
226 Re Mallet and Edith Cowan University [2005] WAICmr 19 (7 November 2005). 
227 Ibid [45]–[47], where the Western Australian Information Commissioner commented as follows: 
I would have expected as a matter of good administrative practice that, if the meeting occurred, 
there would … exist some documentation recording, at the least: the fact that a meeting of the 
Board of Examiners took place on 9 February 2001; what was discussed at that meeting; and 
the decisions taken at that meeting … the dearth of documentation relating to it raises ques-
tions about the agency’s record-keeping practices, as do the difficulties experienced by the 
agency in identifying and locating all relevant documents in response to the complainant’s ac-
cess application and in response to the complaint to my office … This complaint highlights the 
fundamental importance of proper record keeping in terms of agencies’ accountability for their 
processes, actions and decisions, particularly decisions that directly and significantly affect 
individuals. 
228 Anderson v The Pro-Vice Chancellor, Charles Sturt University [2003] NSWADT 121 (23 May 
2003) [20] (O’Connor DCJ). 
229 Ibid [3]. 
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to be regretted’231 that the mathematical error now conceded by the University 
had not been identified much earlier in the dispute. 
It is ironic that decisions such as this, while identifying shortfalls in university 
practices regarding the preparation of documents such as marking guides, and 
meticulous record keeping, do not, on the face of it, encourage improvement. A 
university can simply respond to a FOI application by stating that the requested 
document does not exist. 
2 Documents Containing Material Obtained in Confidence or Affecting 
Personal Privacy 
Documents are also exempt under FOI legislation if disclosure would divulge 
information communicated in confidence,232 or would involve the unreasonable 
disclosure of personal information.233 
Having failed to access a non-existent marking guide, Tony Redfern also failed 
to get access to a random sample of other students’ exam papers, the AAT 
holding that disclosure of exam responses subject to an obligation of confidenti-
ality would be a misuse of information received in confidence.234 
In another case, when Deakin University refused to release the name and 
contact details of an examiner of Ali Darwish’s PhD thesis, arguing that disclo-
sure would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information relating to the 
personal affairs of the examiner, 235  the Victorian Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal (‘VCAT’) did not uphold the exemption asserted by the University, 
stating that: 
The system for examination of PhD theses must be transparently fair … Com-
munity attitudes to disclosure of the names of individuals has [sic] undergone 
significant change in the past decade. There is now greater emphasis on the pro-
tection of personal privacy, which tends towards non-disclosure. On the other 
hand, there is greater emphasis on accountability, with tends towards higher 
levels of disclosure. The case before the Tribunal falls into the second of those 
two categories … a sufficient lack of transparency in the examination process 
has been demonstrated to tip the balance of reasonableness in favour of the ap-
plicant.236 
VCAT was also not persuaded by the University’s argument that disclosure of the 
name of the examiner would impair the ability of the University to secure 
examiners in the particular discipline in the future given the evidence that 95–97 
per cent of the examiners employed each year by the University were not 
concerned about anonymity.237 
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s 35. 
233 See, eg, Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) s 41; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) 
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3 Exemptions in Relation to Tests, Examinations and Audits 
(a)   General Exemptions 
Some exemptions under FOI legislation apply more generally to protect the 
aim and operation of tests, examinations or audits.238 A further reason the AAT 
denied Redfern access to a sample of students’ exam responses and ‘the most 
important ground for exemption’239  was that disclosure could reasonably be 
expected to prejudice the effectiveness of procedures for the conduct of examina-
tions,240  and because there was no countervailing public interest to require 
disclosure.241  The AAT accepted the evidence of the Vice-Chancellor and 
academics in the Faculty of Management and School of Law that disclosure 
would undermine the finality of the assessment and review process and the 
security and integrity of the exam system should exam responses be released.242 
In another case, the AAT was also unable to conclude that it would be in the 
public interest for copies of examination papers and marking sheets used in a 
training course at the Australian Federal Police College to be made available, 
even though it was ‘of the opinion that there is a public interest that such training 
procedures and tests … should be as open and as fair as possible’.243 
However, there was one case in which the balance of public interest did favour 
the granting of the application.244 That case involved a group of history honours 
graduates who sought access to information on staff record sheets relating to the 
assessment of their performance. The Australian National University had denied 
access on the ground that disclosure would prejudice the assessment system. The 
AAT granted access because ‘students have a legitimate interest in knowing what 
is said by their supervisor about their … thesis’.245 The AAT also agreed with the 
evidence of some witnesses that, in assessing the work of a student, an academic 
 
238 See Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) ss 40(1)–(2). See also Freedom of Information Act 
1989 (ACT) ss 40(1)(a)–(b); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW) sch 1 pt 3 cll 16(a)(i)–(ii); 
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243 Re Ascic and Australian Federal Police [1986] AATA 108 (18 April 1986) [23] (Sir Prentice, 
Member Pascoe, Member Wilkins). The appeal to the Federal Court of Australia was dismissed: 
Ascic v Australian Federal Police (1986) 11 ALN N184. 
244 Re James and Australian National University (1984) 6 ALD 687. Cf Re Ascic and Australian 
Federal Police [1986] AATA 108 (18 April 1986) [23] (Sir Prentice, Members Pascoe and Wil-
kins). 
245 Ibid 704 [99] (Deputy President Hall). 
   
 
  
2010] Legal Challenges to University Decisions Affecting Students 177 
 
     
must be prepared to make judgments honestly and impartially and be prepared to 
stand by those judgments. It stated: 
The question is whether graduate students should be denied access to informa-
tion about their undergraduate performance because of fears that open disclo-
sure may prejudice the assessment system by exposing some members of aca-
demic staff to pressures with which they may be unable to cope. However, the 
pressures flowing from greater accountability are, in my view, an inescapable 
concomitant of more open government. To react too timorously to every antici-
pated situation of pressure could well negate the principles underlying the 
Freedom of Information Act. Whether those principles fit comfortably upon an 
academic institution such as the Australian National University may be another 
question. But it is not a question to which I need to address myself. Parliament 
has made the decision that the Act is to apply.246 
The AAT also noted that there is  
a public interest in such records being maintained accurately and fairly … [and] 
if, as a consequence of the Freedom of Information Act, greater care is taken by 
academic staff as to the comments recorded, that will serve the public inter-
est.247  
(b)   Specific Exemptions 
Another category of exemption under some FOI legislation is the exemption 
that applies specifically to examination papers, reports or similar documents 
when the use for which the documents were prepared has not been completed.248 
Victoria has ‘what appears to be a much narrower provision in relation to 
examination material than the Commonwealth and other States’,249 and it is also 
the only state that empowers its external review body to grant access to exempt 
documents where it is of the opinion that the public interest requires that access 
to the document should be granted.250 
Zane McKean recently sought and was denied access to an exam paper and the 
exam marking guides that did in fact exist for finance and investments subjects at 
The University of Melbourne. When he commenced legal proceedings, he did 
not rely on the public interest override in the Victorian FOI legislation;251 he 
 
246 Ibid 703 [96]. 
247 Ibid 704 [98]. 
248 See, eg, Information Act 2003 (NT) s 57(3)(d); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (Tas) s 32(c); 
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) s 34(4)(c). 
249 McKean v University of Melbourne (General) [2007] VCAT 1310 (31 July 2007) [24] (Deputy 
President Dwyer). 
250 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) s 50(4). The Victorian public interest ‘override’ is 
unusual and allows for the release of documents that would otherwise have been exempt under 
the Victorian FOI legislation. If VCAT finds that documents are not exempt, it is unnecessary for 
it to decide whether s 50(4) applies. VCAT will only consider whether the ‘public interest over-
ride’ applies if it finds documents are exempt on other grounds: Mees v University of Melbourne 
[2009] VCAT 782 (6 May 2009) affd [2009] VSC 493 (5 November 2009). 
251 See McKean v University of Melbourne [2007] VCAT 1310 (31 July 2007) [31] where it was 
noted by Deputy President Dwyer ‘for the record’ that ‘the applicant did not seek to avail himself 
of this provision and he did not argue that the public interest necessitated disclosure of docu-
ments in the public interest if they were otherwise exempt under either of the grounds claimed by 
the University.’ 
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simply argued the documents were not exempt documents as the University 
claimed. This argument was ultimately successful. 
The evidence of the head of the University’s Department of Finance was that: 
there was a relatively narrow syllabus for these two subjects; the same syllabus 
had to be covered each time the subjects were offered; the subject matter of the 
examination was largely quantitative, rather than qualitative; there is a limited 
amount of information that can be examined, so questions are ‘recycled’ from 
year to year as it is impractical to set fresh questions each year; disclosure of 
marking guides from a particular semester would enable students in a future 
semester to ‘learn by heart’ answers to common questions without necessarily 
gaining the technical knowledge, giving them a false sense of their real level of 
knowledge; disclosure of marking guides would give a false sense that the 
material in the guides comprised ‘model answers’ rather than being guides to 
what might be a correct answer; and disclosure of marking guides would impact 
on the methods and procedures used by the University for the conduct of future 
examinations in these two subjects.252 
This evidence was used by the University to contend that the marking guides 
were internal working documents and that their disclosure would be contrary to 
the public interest. VCAT was not satisfied that it would be contrary to the public 
interest (as opposed to being merely inconvenient) to disclose the marking 
guides.253 The University’s concerns about a more open disclosure policy did not 
outweigh the principles of openness enshrined in the FOI legislation. VCAT also 
noted that 
most positions of responsibility in the community involve pressures of some 
degree, and the community should expect from University examiners a reason-
able level of transparency in the assessments of their students … unless there is 
a clear case for exemption under the FOI Act, there is a public benefit in having 
a transparent assessment process.254 
The University also argued that the marking guides and the examination paper 
came within the specific exemption relating to examination papers,255  and 
attempted to argue that the release of the documents in the context of subjects 
with a very narrow syllabus would prejudice the effectiveness of testing proce-
dures or the attainment of the objects of the exams. However, in the view of 
Deputy President Dwyer: 
Had I been considering the matter under this other legislation in other jurisdic-
tions, it may have been possible for the University to argue, and for me to make 
a finding, along such lines. However, I cannot imply into the Victorian legisla-
tion something that is not there. If the use or uses for which the marking guides 
and examination papers were prepared has been completed, the exemption un-
 
252 Ibid [9]. 
253 Ibid [18]. 
254 Ibid [15]. 
255 See Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) s 34(4). 
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der s 34(4)(c) of the Victorian FOI Act fails to apply, and the extent of any pos-
sible prejudice becomes irrelevant to this ground.256 
The University also tried to use the evidence to imply a ‘public interest’ test 
into the examination paper exemption.257 This attempt also failed. In the view of 
Deputy President Dwyer, the only dispute under this provision was ‘whether the 
use or uses for which the documents were prepared had been completed.’258 As it 
was clear on the face of the documents that each of them was prepared solely for 
use in the particular exam in the particular subject in the particular semester, and 
since this use was completed at the end of the exam period when the results were 
published, none of the documents were exempt.259 The University’s appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Victoria was dismissed.260 
V  CO N C L U S I O N 
The increase in litigation involving universities and students tends to suggest 
that internal rules and processes are not achieving the desired outcomes as well 
as one would hope or expect.261 This inference is reinforced by the reported 
increase in complaints to parliamentary Ombudsmen. The use of internal 
grievance procedures is generally simpler and less time-consuming than litiga-
tion. It is difficult to understand why some students bypass these procedures and 
student Ombudsmen entirely and go directly to a court or tribunal with their 
complaints about adverse decisions. Students are mostly self-represented before 
these external bodies, which may be a reason for the relatively large number of 
matters that fail simply on jurisdictional grounds and involve ‘an unwieldy 
bundle of claims’.262 Courts and tribunals will assume jurisdiction in appropriate 
cases but, in matters involving academic judgment, they will be reluctant to 
intervene, deferring to the authority of the academy. Attempts to involve a court 
in adjudication upon questions of academic judgment and upon the content and 
standard required by a university for the award of its degrees have been unsuc-
cessful. A fail grade on an assessment will not be sufficient on its own to ground 
a successful application for legal redress.263 It is clearly necessary for students to 
simply accept that their efforts do not always meet the standards set by the 
universities. Similarly, in the absence of evidence that they were treated differ-
ently, students will be hard pressed to use anti-discrimination laws to challenge 
university decisions. 
The cases have shown the courts will sometimes require universities to make 
information about assessment available to students and will clearly distinguish 
 
256 McKean v University of Melbourne [2007] VCAT 1310 (31 July 2007) [25]. 
257 Ibid [26]. 
258 Ibid [22]. 
259 Ibid [29]–[30]. 
260 University of Melbourne v McKean [2008] VSC 325 (28 August 2008). 
261 Hilary Astor, ‘Improving Dispute Resolution in Australian Universities: Options for the Future’ 
(2005) 27 Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management 49. 
262 Hanna v University of New England [2006] NSWSC 122 (5 April 2006) [2] (Malpass AsJ). 
263 See, eg, Ivins v Griffith University [2001] QCA 393 (19 September 2001). 
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matters of academic judgment from disciplinary or procedural matters. Courts 
insist on high standards of procedural fairness and will intervene if this has been 
denied to a student, even if university decision-makers have followed internal 
rules. Even so, the only remedy available to a court is to declare a decision void 
and to remit it to the decision-maker, so this may ultimately be a pyrrhic victory 
for the student. 
The apparent successes of university defendants comes at a cost in terms of 
time, money and adverse public attention incurred in responding to student 
challenges. Grievances that may once have been dealt with internally by the 
University Visitor are now being looked at externally in a very public setting. 
Although often unable to grant the remedies sought by students, in some 
instances, courts and tribunals have been critical of universities’ administrative 
practices. It is clearly in the interests of universities to avoid legal challenges to 
their decisions affecting students. Ensuring that policies and practices are 
accessible, clear and fair is obviously good administrative practice and the most 
desirable course for all universities to follow. The establishment of university 
Ombudsmen who are available, independent and impartial could also lead to less 
litigation. While a focus on getting procedures absolutely right in their formula-
tion and operation should be the priority, there can be no guarantee that there will 
never be external challenges. 
The cases chronicled above provide a clear indication that courts and tribunals 
are not the most appropriate fora for the resolution of these challenges. What is 
the solution? The increase in complaints to parliamentary Ombudsmen suggests 
that more students are looking in that direction for assistance with their griev-
ances. It is time for serious consideration to be given to what would best fill the 
void left by the demise of the University Visitor and to consolidate the various 
avenues for external review. 
